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All rights reDrilling through mountains, slowing or redirecting rivers, conquering
the ocean; all thesemiracles of human industry are gameswhen com-
pared with the task of making man see and act according to his true
self-interest. ðFrancisco de Cabarrús, Sobre los obstáculos de opin-
1ión y el medio de removerlos, 1795Þ
IntroductionDuring the eighteenth century, an interesting debate emerged in Spain regarding
the advantages and disadvantages of informing the people or keeping them ig-
norant of the affairs of state, as well as the question—if choosing the former op-
tion—of whether to tell them the truth or manipulate them with lies. Although
we may consider this to be a moral or philanthropic concern within the general
context of the Enlightenment, for the absolute monarchs and the writers sym-
pathetic to them the issue was primarily a question of state. What was the most
effective means to govern?
Throughout the kingdoms of eighteenth-century Europe, the elite had expanded
beyond the titled nobility thanks to the unstoppable ingress of the lower no-
bility and middle classes into administration, commerce, and the Republic of
Letters, as well as influential positions in the military and the church. The gov-
ernment could not afford to maintain the traditional hermeticism of the monar-
chy while attempting to cultivate the loyalty of this increasingly broad and in-
fluential public. In the last third of the century it became clear that the king’s
veil of secrecy over state affairs was not suitable for ruling the most educatedroyal subjects, whose collective views constituted the precursor to
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2 Calvo Maturanawhat we might call a “public opinion.” By informing and forging bonds with
this elite, monarchies not only gained capable allies but also avoided making
dangerous enemies. Left to follow its own free will, or treated like the rest of the
population, this public might distance itself from the monarchic project and gen-
erate its own opinion, something potentially dangerous to the preservation of the
status quo.
In 1778, in accordance with the express wishes of Friedrich II and at the re-
quest of D’Alembert, the Academy of Berlin convened a literary contest with
the question: “Is it useful to deceive the people?”2 The contest responded to a
generalized European debate over how best to practice politics; without a doubt,
it helped to expand this debate further still.3 Deception and concealment in
political practice—championed by Machiavelli, among others4—had consti-
tuted part of the raison d’état during the ancien régime. Eighteenth-century
paternalism had done nothing if not reinforce the value of the “noble lie,”5 a
tactic that found numerous critics among Enlightenment authors, proponents of
educating the public and helping it to come out of nonage. Of the thirty-three
submissions to the contest in Berlin, twenty proposed that it was not useful to lie
to the public; thirteen proposed that it was. The academy—probably to humor
Friedrich II, who had become an advocate of deceit over the years—gave a prize
to one defender of each stance.6
Many other absolute monarchs besides the king of Prussia were familiar with
this new sensibility, which they virtually always considered from the point of
2 Werner Crauss found the forty-two texts and published a selection of them, along with
other documents of interest ðsuch as the correspondence between D’Alembert and Frie-
drich II, or Condorcet’s work on the same themeÞ. See Werner Crauss, ed., Est-il utile
de tromper le peuple? Ist der Volksbetrug von Nutzen? ðBerlin, 1966Þ. There also exists an
Italian version: Bisogna ingannare il popolo? ðBari, 1968Þ. In Spain, a compilation sim-
ilar to that of Crauss was published with an introduction by Javier de Lucas: ¿Es con-
veniente engañar al pueblo? (política y filosofía en la Ilustración: El concurso de 1778
de la Real Academia de Ciencias de Berlín), ed. Javier de Lucas ðMadrid, 1991Þ. See
also Jeremy L. Caradonna, The Enlightenment in Practice: Academic Prize Contests and
Intellectual Culture in France, 1670–1794 ðIthaca, NY, 2012Þ.
3 Before and after the contest, prestigious authors expressed their opinions on the topic.
See Voltaire, Jusqu’à quel point on doit tromper le peuple ð1756Þ, and Condorcet, Est-il
utile au peuple d’être trompé? ð1790Þ.
4 See, for instance, the German humanist Sebastian Frank and his Paradoxa ð1534Þ, or
the Spaniard Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, in his Idea de un príncipe político y cristiano
representado en cien empresas ð1640Þ.
5 Miguel Catalán, “Introducción,” in Marqués de Condorcet, ¿Es conveniente engañar
al pueblo? ðMadrid, 2009Þ, 31 pp.
6 Other works that address this issue include Lester Gilbert Crocker, “The Problem
of Truth and Falsehood in the Age of Enlightenment,” Journal of the History of Ideas
14, no. 4 ð1953Þ: 575–603; and Jean-Marie Therrien, “Est-il utile de tromper le peuple?
ðquestion de 1780Þ,” Philosopher 10 ð1990–91Þ: 53–71.
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The Debate on Public Information in Spain 3view of optimizing their resources. Absolute monarchies such as the Prussian,
the French, and the Spanish, which were not particularly inclined to justify their
policies to the people, revised their views on the subject, but they did so without
revolutionizing it. Moved by the “science of police,”7 eighteenth-century mon-
archs gradually changed their role and ceased to seek the maintenance of so-
ciety in its current state, instead intervening in it directly and attempting to
manage the lives of men and women at the personal and collective levels. For
that purpose, commanding was not enough; they also had to convince.
I do not intend to imply that absolutism—or other, previous forms of govern-
ment—had been mute before the late Enlightenment. The sovereigns of the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries usually addressed their subjects in messages
conveyed via public proclamations, festivities, fine arts, the theater, and the pul-
pit ðthe great mass media of the ancien régimeÞ. They thus communicated royal
orders, news such as declarations of war or royal weddings, and messages of
obedience. José Antonio Maravall brilliantly demonstrated that in this sense
the baroque was an inexhaustible source of propaganda for the Habsburgs of
seventeenth-century Spain.8 But at all times—according to rulers and the au-
thors of political treatises—there had existed the underlying notion that the
absolute king should not lower himself by giving explanations and that orders
and official communications were sufficient. They never lost sight of informa-
tional secrecy, since the reasoning that led the monarch to make each decision
constituted arcana imperii.9
But the desacralization of the monarchy,10 the infiltration of Enlightenment
thought into the practice of power, and the eighteenth-century exaltation of the
development of the state all presupposed a change in political praxis. Did in-
formation have any sort of political utility? Was it better to conceal the facts
or to offer a manipulated version of them?
In absolutist France, the economy was an exercise in political information.The notion of the importance of the public for proper government, characteris-
7 According to Delamare’s Traité de la police ð1705Þ, this enlightened science
covered religion, morality, health, provisions, roads, canals, ports and public buildings,
public safety, liberal arts, commerce, factories, servants and farm workers, and the poor.
The aim of the science of policía was “to develop those elements constitutive of
individuals’ lives in such a way that their development also fosters that of the strength
of the State” ðMichel Foucault, “Omnes er Singulatim: Towards a Criticism of Political
Reason,” in Power ½New York, 1994, 322Þ.
8 José Antonio Maravall, La cultura del Barroco: Análisis de una estructura histórica
ðBarcelona, 1975Þ.
9 Robert Darnton, “An Early Information Society: News and the Media in Eighteenth
Century,” American Historical Review 105, no. 1 ð2000Þ: 1–35.
10 Jeffrey Merrick, The Desacralization of the French Monarchy in the Eighteenth Cen-
tury ðBaton Rouge, LA, 1990Þ; Paul Kléber Monod, The Power of Kings: Monarchy and
Religion in Europe, 1589–1715 ðNew Haven, CT, 1999Þ.
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4 Calvo Maturanatic of British parliamentarianism, crossed the English Channel through the work
of the Scotsman John Law11 and later through that of the Anglophile Jacques
Necker. The latter, minister of finance under Louis XVI, published the Crown’s
accounting books in 1781 ðCompte rendu au RoiÞ and authored a work address-
ing the importance of public trust to the health of the economy ðDe l’admin-
istration des finances de la France, 1784Þ.12
As was the case with other schools of thought, the French reception of these
ideas facilitated their arrival in Spain. Without a doubt, the works of Jacques
Necker crossed the Pyrenees,13 but they were not the only ones. Ludovico Mu-
ratori, whose Pubblica felicitá ðPublic happinessÞ was translated into Spanish
in 1790, found fault with the idea “that it is better for a Prince to command
an ignorant people than a learned one, for the ignorant obey more easily
and let themselves be controlled, oblivious to the flaws and vices of govern-
ment.”14 The debate about informing the people was directly linked to a com-
monplace of the Enlightenment: universal education.
The Spanish case is key for an understanding of European absolutist mon-
archies’ attempts at renewal toward the end of the eighteenth century. If the fi-
nal two decades of the reign of Charles III ð1759–88Þ had taken the course of
a peaceful and moderate reformism inspired by the Enlightenment, the rule of
his successor, Charles IV ð1788–1808Þ, was marked and thrown off balance
15by the French Revolution. To avoid following in the footsteps of the executed
11 Thomas E. Kaiser, “Money, Despotism and Public Opinion in Early Eighteenth-
Century France: John Law and the Debate on Royal Credit,” Journal of Modern History
63 ð1991Þ: 4–16.
12 See Léonard Burnand, Necker et l’opinion publique ðParis, 2004Þ; Robert D. Harris,
Necker: Reform Minister of the Old Regime ðBerkeley, 1979Þ; Robert D. Harris, “French
Finances and the AmericanWar, 1777–1783,” Journal of Modern History 48 ðJune 1976Þ:
233–58, and “Necker’s Compte Rendu of 1781: A Reconsideration,” Journal of Modern
History 42 ðJune 1970Þ: 162–83; and Esteban López-Escobar, “La opinión pública, ‘héroe’
de la política: La contribución de J. Necker,” Doxa comunicación: Revista interdisci-
plinar de estudios de comunicación y ciencias sociales 7 ð2008Þ: 25–41.
13 On Necker’s influence on Spanish economics, see Jesús Astigarraga Goenaga,
“Necker en España, 1780–1800,” Revista de economía aplicada 8, no. 23 ð2000Þ: 119–
44. On the reception of his ideas on state administration, see David Alonso García and
David Villar Barragán, “Necker y España: La transformación administrativa de 1788,”
Cuadernos de historia moderna 18 ð1997Þ: 87–118.
14 Ludovico Antonio Muratori, La pública felicidad objeto de los buenos príncipes
ðMadrid, 1790; Italian 1st ed., 1749Þ, 58.
15 An astute analysis of the Spanish situation may be found in Richard Herr, The
Eighteenth Century Revolution in Spain ðPrinceton, NJ, 1958Þ, which continues to be the
English-language point of reference for late eighteenth-century Spanish history. It is a
pioneering, meritorious, and still relevant work, but its age clearly indicates a need for
renovation of the canon of English-language works on the history of Spain. The works
of Emilio La Parra López cited here are recommended for Spanish readers. On the influ-
ence of the French Revolution in Spain, see Herr, The Eighteenth Century Revolution in
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The Debate on Public Information in Spain 5French royal family, the Spanish branch of the Bourbon dynasty intensified a
two-pronged process that it had already begun prior to 1789: the consolidation
and protection of royal power, on the one hand, and an ornamental adaptation
to the liberal Enlightenment creed, on the other. The shift in strategies for com-
municating with the public speaks to both concerns.
With the objective of analyzing these political and cultural changes, this arti-
cle is divided into three parts. In the first, I will reflect on the concept of public
opinion in Spain during the crisis of the ancien régime. One cannot speak of
any authentic public opinion when there is no dialogue with power—that is, with
the only party empowered to speak, which therefore has no need to listen. But
it does seem fitting to identify that knowledgeable public for which ecclesias-
tical propaganda and the theocratic system had lost credibility and to which
the monarchy now reached out in an attempt to gain its loyalty. This sector of
the population would be the foundation of public opinion in the kingless Spain
of 1808 and in the liberal Cortes of 1812.
Next, I will identify the ways in which the debate on public information
marked the Hispanic monarchy. A series of intellectuals who were linked to ad-
ministrative, military, or ecclesiastic service between 1780 and 1808 asked
themselves similar questions toward the end of the century and arrived at the
conclusion that hermeticism and isolationism were not the best way of doing
politics. Contrary to what had previously been believed, the king’s absolute
power could be even greater if, thanks to the dissemination of propaganda by
the apparatus of state, he managed to shape public opinion and earn the loy-
alty of the people. He who obeys out of a sense of conviction does so more
efficiently than an automaton; the ignorant had little to contribute to the pub-
lic good. These are the arguments of the Enlightenment intellectuals whom
we will consider here. They include, among others, Manuel Aguirre, Juan Pablo
Forner, Valentín de Foronda, Juan Sempere y Guarinos, Francisco Cabarrús,
and Juan Meléndez Valdés.
Third and finally, having established the theory, I will consider the practice of
royal policy. Through various examples, we will see to what extent this thought
had penetrated the policy of the absolute monarchy. I will not argue that
Charles IV ð1788–1808Þ broke radically with the practice of silence and secrecy
characteristic of the ancien régime, but nonetheless he was more inclined than any
previous Spanish monarch to use the means of communication at his disposal
to shape public opinion, mainly ðaside from the century’s cultural inheritanceÞ
Spain, 239–68; Jean-René Aymes, “Las repercusiones político-ideológicas de la Revolu-
ción Francesa en España ð1789–1795Þ: Esbozo de síntesis,” in Ilustración y Revolución
Francesa en España ðLleida, 2005Þ, 147–72; Jean-René Aymes, ed., España y la Revolu-
ción Francesa ðBarcelona, 1989Þ; Enrique Moral Sandoval, ed., España y la Revolución
Francesa ðMadrid, 1989Þ; and Emilio de Diego et al., eds., Repercusiones de la Revolu-
ción Francesa en España ðMadrid, 1990Þ.
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6 Calvo Maturanadue to the exceptionally difficult political and economic circumstances that he
and his vassals had to deal with.16 Still, internal political affairs remained veiled
from the public eye until the end of his reign. It was then, in the acute crisis
of 1807 and 1808, that both Charles IV and his successor, Ferdinand VII, gave
themselves over to the public, whose support they desperately needed.
Public Opinion in Absolutist Spain?
Unfortunately, outside its borders the history of Spain is relatively unknown,
especially in a period such as the eighteenth century, during which the His-
panic monarchy—notwithstanding its immense colonial empire—played a sec-
ondary political role. Nonetheless, the peculiarities of the highly mediated Span-
ish Enlightenment, the attempts of the absolute monarchy to adapt to the times,
and, finally, the subsequent––heterodox and discontinuous––liberal movement
present idiosyncrasies that provide an interesting counterpoint to the “canoni-
cal” French model.17
The period to be analyzed here ð1780–1808Þ coincides with the last years of
the reign of Charles III ð1759–88Þ and the entire reign of Charles IV ð1788–
1808Þ. The two kings were adherents of so-called enlightened absolutism ðor
despotismÞ,18 the political system that propelled a series of reforms intended to
reinforce the state with the goal of increasing the power of the monarchs over
their territory and exploiting more fully the military and economic resources
19that the country had to offer. For eighteenth-century absolutism, the Enlight-
16 The reign of Charles IV ð1788–1808Þ was marked by tremendous political and
economic difficulties. First the French Revolution compelled him to begin a war against
the nation that had been Spain’s ally for an entire century. After Spain’s reconciliation
with France in 1795, and especially after the rise of Napoleon, Charles IV found himself
trapped between an extremely demanding ally, the French Empire, and a historical en-
emy ðGreat BritainÞ that both coveted his overseas possessions and sought to break his
commercial monopoly over them. Internally, the situation was even worse: Charles IV’s
son, the future Ferdinand VII, conspired against his parents and their unpopular minister,
Manuel Godoy, eventually overthrowing them in the 1808 Mutiny of Aranjuez after the
French invasion of Spain.
17 This crucial and exciting period of Spanish history has been broadly disregarded in
international studies, in part because the processes of political and cultural evolution in
Britain and France have been considered the “orthodox”models, tending to eclipse others.
Arguably, however, the predominant image of this century was not the most widespread
one. The study of different systems, such as the Spanish one, can vastly enrich our
knowledge of the period through an international perspective, offering a “third point” of
comparison not only with France and England but also with other states, such as Portugal
or Naples.
18 Both oxymorons ð“enlightened absolutism” and “enlightened despotism”Þ are used
to describe this period.
19 A brilliant overview of this period is to be found in the already classic work of Anto-
nio Domínguez Ortiz, Sociedad y estado en el siglo XVIII español ðBarcelona, 1976Þ.
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The Debate on Public Information in Spain 7enment was not only a source of prestige but also an instrument for recruit-
ing members of the intellectual elite and employing them in the service of the
state. Their tasks were to realize reforms and to produce moralizing literature
that would defend the sovereignty of the monarch or censure his critics, as well
as treatises or translations of works of experimental science that could lead to
the material betterment of the kingdom.20
Thanks to patronage and iron-fisted censorship, monarchical control of the
press and artistic expression was nearly complete.21 The only way to work for
the “common good” was to participate in state administration and/or official
institutions such as the Academies ðof History, of the Language, of Medicine,
etc.Þ or the Economic Societies of Friends of the Country ðSociedades eco-
nómicas de amigos del paísÞ. The elites who took part in these activities not
only collaborated in the exaltation of a paternal and patriotic king but also be-
gan to form a common identity as servants of the nation. They were the “citi-
zens without sovereignty” who would end up displacing the monarch from
power during the Liberal Revolutions.22
Common clichés aside, Spain did not live in cultural isolation from the rest of
Europe. The internal expansion, consolidation, and growing clout of the Span-
ish middle classes in general,23 and the political and intellectual class in particu-
lar, were compounded by French influence both before and after 1789.24 The
French Revolution—for which the American Revolution, in turn, had been a
20 Joaquín Álvarez Barrientos, ed., Se hicieron literatos para ser políticos: Cultura y
política en la España de Carlos IV y Fernando VII ðCádiz, 2004Þ.
21 Esteban Conde Naranjo, El argos de la monarquía: La policía del libro en la España
ilustrada (1750–1834) ðMadrid, 2006Þ.
22 David A. Bell, Lawyers and Citizens: The Making of a Political Elite in Old Regime
France ðPrinceton, NJ, 1994Þ; Daniel Gordon, Citizens without Sovereignty: Equality and
Sociability in French Thought, 1670–1789 ðPrinceton, NJ, 1994Þ.
23 Spain lacked an important commercial bourgeoisie; these middle classes were made
up of members of the administration and the army, the hidalgos ðnobles without specific
titlesÞ and lesser nobility, urban oligarchies, and businesspeople.
24 Through the so-called Family Pacts, the Bourbons on both sides of the Pyrenees had
formed a powerful geopolitical bloc that was capable of defeating England in the context of
the American War of Independence. After 1789, the Hispanic monarchy had to revise its
internal policy, radicalizing censorship, revitalizing the role of the Inquisition, and shutting
down all unofficial newspapers to avoid “contagion.” It also had to reconsider its interna-
tional alliances. Although Charles IV never even came close to renouncing his absolut-
ism, the French Revolution “modernized” the Hispanicmonarchy in a sense.When, in 1795
ðPeace of BaselÞ and 1796 ðTreaty of San IldefonsoÞ, Spain again allied itself with France,
dynastic and political loyalty were relegated to a secondary plane, as priority was given to
economic and geo-strategic interests. Internally, the permeability of the government and
the political class to French culture continued to be indisputable. The government of
Napoleon Bonaparte was especially influential; the official Spanish propaganda machine
let itself be seduced by the political modus operandi of an emperor that governed France
according to the tenets of absolutism, but with the mask of freedom, equality, and fraternity.
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8 Calvo Maturanaclear antecedent—put all European monarchies, but especially the Spanish one,
in check. On the one hand, it completely upset Spain’s strategic play of alli-
ances25 ðconverting the constant ally of an entire century into both a terrible en-
emy and a dangerous friendÞ;26 on the other, it introduced the venom of distrust
into the authorities and the virus of curiosity and novelty into the people. The
question is: did there exist, under Spanish absolutism, a public opinion that
the authorities should fear? Or was there only a public—an elite that had not
achieved the Kantian age of majority—to be manipulated? Can we speak of the
existence of public opinion during the absolute government of Charles III and
Charles IV?27 Or is it necessary to wait for the Napoleonic invasion (1808) and
the liberal Constitution of Cádiz ð1812Þ?28
Half a century after Jürgen Habermas weighed in on the concept of pub-
lic opinion, his work continues to be an obligatory point of reference both for
those subscribing to his ideas and for those wishing to nuance them.29 The re-
lated bibliography has grown to the point of unwieldiness, which is understand-
able when one takes into account the unquestionable appeal of the topic for po-
litical scientists, sociologists, and historians.
As is well known, Habermas linked the rise of a public sphere ðwith a public
opinion to counteract the official oneÞ to the bourgeois maturity that necessarily
30preceded the Liberal Revolutions. In its mature form, public opinion is a forum
25 Emilio La Parra López, La alianza deGodoy con los revolucionarios ðMadrid, 1992Þ;
and Antonio Calvo Maturana, “Génesis del II Imperio Británico y ocaso del universalismo
español: La doble vertiente del conflicto de Nootka ð1790Þ,”Hispania 68, no. 228 ð2008Þ:
151–92, 159.
26 The War of the Convention ð1793–95Þ was followed by a period of Spanish-French
alliance ð1796–1808Þ, which was broken with the Napoleonic invasion of the Iberian
Peninsula.
27 See an extended version of this epigraph in Antonio Calvo Maturana, “Rumor y
opinión pública en la España de Carlos IV: La transición entre dos modelos políticos,
sociales y culturales,” in Presencia y visibilidad de las mujeres: Recuperando historia, ed.
Rosa María Capel Martínez ðMadrid, 2013Þ, 105–56.
28 Richard Hocquellet, “La aparición de la opinión pública en España: Una práctica
fundamental para la construcción del primer liberalismo ð1808–1810Þ,” Historia contem-
poránea 27 ð2003Þ: 615–29, issue devoted to “Conceptos políticos: Opinión pública
intelectual”; Eugenia Molina, “Opinión pública y revolución: El imaginario de una nueva
autoridad ð1810–1820Þ,” Revista de historia del derecho 31 ð2003Þ: 271–324; Claude
Morange, “Opinión pública: Cara y cruz del concepto en el primer liberalismo español,”
in Sociabilidad y liberalismo en la España del siglo XIX: Homenaje al profesor Alberto
Gil Novales, ed. J. F. Fuentes and Lluis Roura i Aulinas ðLleida, 2001Þ, 117–46; and Dardo
Pérez Guilhou, La opinión pública española y las Cortes de Cádiz frente a la emancipa-
ción hispanoamericana, 1808–1814 ðBuenos Aires, 1981Þ.
29 We refer to the famous work by Jürgen Habermas published in 1964 and translated
into English as The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.
30 In 1990, in the preface to a new edition of his seminal book, Habermas acknowl-
edged some flaws in his original theory. He recognized “certain empirical deficiencies”
critiqued by historians, such as the Adamism latent in the link between the rise of ca-
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The Debate on Public Information in Spain 9for debate and competent judgment: an informed public ðthanks to free means
of communication and to the state itselfÞ weighs and reaches a consensus on its
diverse points of view in order to make its opinion known to the parliament, the
final forum that will translate its binding decisions to the political power, which
thus becomes a mere executor of public will. But in recent years historians have
made an effort to prove the existence of public opinion not only prior to the
eighteenth century but also in the Middle Ages,31 and even in antiquity.32 Spain
has been no exception, and we can find titles that trace its path centuries before
there even existed the binomial of “public opinion,”33 a term that we can mea-
sure with an eyedropper in European literature of the modern age until well into
34the eighteenth century.
31 For example, J. R. Maddicott, scholar of the institutions of medieval England,
makes reference in various studies to the presence of public opinion during that period
ðJohn Robert Maddicott, “The County Community and the Making of Public Opinion
in Fourteenth-Century England,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 5, no. 28
½1978: 27–43, and The Origins of the English Parliament, 924–1327 ½Oxford, 2008Þ.
From a perspective closer to that of cultural history, Bernard Guenée has studied the im-
age of public opinion toward the end of the Middle Ages ðBernard Guenée, Ĺopinion
publique à la fin du Moyen Age: D’après la “Chronique de Charles VI” du religieux de
Saint Denis ½Paris, 2002Þ. Finally, the American Charles W. Connell has announced the
upcoming publication of a book entitled Vox Populi, Vox Dei: Public Opinion in the High
Middle Ages.
32 Various highly influential works relating the religious wars of the Empire to wars of
public opinion were published in the 1970s. See Marta Sordi, “Opinione pubblica e
persecuzioni anticristiane nell’Impero romano,” CISA 5 ð1978Þ: 158–70, and Aspetti
dell’opiniones pubblica nel mondo antico, ed. Marta Sordi ðMilan, 1978Þ; Timothy E.
Gregory, Vox Populi: Popular Opinion and Violence in the Religious Controversies of the
Fifth Century A.D. ðColumbus, OH, 1979Þ; José Ramón Aja Sánchez, “‘Vox populi et
princeps’: El impacto de la opinión pública sobre el comportamiento político de los
emperadores romanos,” Latomus 55, no. 2 ð1996Þ: 295–328.
33 For a political and cultural perspective on medieval Spain, see Ana Isabel Carrasco
Manchado, “El rumor político: Apuntes sobre la opinión pública en la Castilla del siglo
XV,” Cuadernos de historia de España 80 ð2006Þ: 65–90, and “‘Vana’ o ‘divina’ vox
populi: La recreación de la opinión pública en Fernando del Pulgar,” in Gobernar en
tiempos de crisis: Las quiebras dinásticas en el ámbito hispánico (1250–1808), ed. José
Manuel Nieto Soria and María Victoria López-Cordón ðMadrid, 2008Þ, 287–305. For an
attempt to offer a vertical historical perspective on the concept—from the Middle Ages
until the contemporary age—see José Manuel Nieto Soria, Luis Miguel Enciso Recio,
Jean-François Botrel, Alejandro Pizarro Quinteroso, and Amalia Sánchez Sampedro, eds.,
Propaganda y opinión pública en la historia ðValladolid, 2007Þ.
34 Cándido Monzón Arribas, La opinión pública: Teorías, conceptos y métodos
ðMadrid, 1987Þ.
nonical public opinion and the bourgeois revolutions, or the scarce attention paid to
other spheres, such as “plebeian publicity.” The German philosopher accepted a revi-
sion of his theory, but “less in its fundamental characteristics than in its degree of com-
plexity” ðJürgen Habermas, “Prefacio a la nueva edición alemana de 1990,” in his His-
toria y crítica de la opinión pública: La transformación estructural de la vida pública
½Barcelona, 1981, 1–39Þ.
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10 Calvo MaturanaWithout a doubt, propaganda from the nexus of power, elite opposition to
the same, and rumors produced by or for the people can be traced throughout
ancient Greece and Rome, medieval Europe, and the early modern age. The heart
of the question is whether or not the sum of these elements may rightly be
called “public opinion.” It is logical to think that in all forms of government
ðeven in the most despotic regimes, in spite of what Montesquieu writes in his
De l’esprit des loisÞ, there existed an elite whose opinion carried weight in
politics, and even that popular sectors were taken into account ðat least during
episodic riots and rebellions brought on by food shortagesÞ. In any case, we
know that the formula extolled by Hesiod—Vox populi, vox Dei—continued to
be used by authors in the service of sovereigns, writing to legitimize their
decisions. We can thus find cultural antecedents of public opinion in Greco-
Roman authors, in Renaissance anthropocentrism, in the dissemination of the
printing press, in the Protestant Reformation, and in the Enlightenment; but
that does not necessarily mean that public opinion, as a politically influential
factor, existed in those societies.
On the other hand, perhaps it makes little sense to confine an analytical in-
strument as pedagogical and useful as that of public opinion to the bourgeois
public sphere. Spanish modernists ourselves have long been anticipating its
presence, associating it with cultural productions such as theater or official
propaganda35 and institutions in decline such as the Cortes,36 in spite of the re-
stricted access to information and the lack of freedom of expression that char-
acterized the ancien régime. Public opinion, communication, and information
have always existed; it is thus excessively deterministic to deny the existence of
a public sphere, with its own public opinion, to any historical reality prior to
the European eighteenth century. There is no completely “uninformed” soci-
ety. As Robert Darnton has written, every era is an information age, each in its
own way, and systems of communication have always shaped historical events.37
38It continues to be a primarily conceptual issue.
35 On Habermas’s 1961 work: “Aswe know, his is an approach bound to the eighteenth-
century rise of the bourgeosie and the cultural shifts encouraged by the Enlightenment;
it is thus all the more valid for the characteristics assumed by public space in the current
age as an intermediate sphere between private life and the State. However, this not only
limits its revision at an earlier stage, but instigates an experiment in intellectual ar-
chaeology to verify to what point the notion of the ‘public sphere’ could be applicable
to pre-Enlightenment times and spaces” ðAntonio Castillo Gómez and James S. Ame-
lang, eds., Opinión pública y espacio urbano en la edad moderna ½Gijón, 2010, 9Þ.
36 Inés Gómez González, “La justicia ante la opinión pública: Las Cortes y la adminis-
tración de justicia durante el reinado de Felipe II,” in Las sociedades ibéricas y el mar a
finales del siglo XVI, ed. Luis Ribot García and Ernest Belenguer Cebriá ðMadrid, 1998Þ,
2:563–72.
37 Darnton, “An Early Information Society.”
38 “If public opinion is broadly interpreted ðas a factÞ, public opinion has always ex-
isted, because: history has shown us, from its very origins, the existence of groups,
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The Debate on Public Information in Spain 11This debate is not fundamental for us, given that we study a moment of
transition toward an “orthodox” public opinion: the bourgeois liberal one. If fol-
lowers of Habermas consider the eighteenth century to be the “prehistory of
public opinion,” we wish to consider its peculiar “neolithic” period in Spain.
We can situate it in the reign of Charles IV, not only because it preceded the
Liberal Revolution and the concurrent emergence of public opinion as a polit-
ically recognized category but also because it presented premature elements,
antecedents of what was to come. The encounter between these incipient
manifestations of modernity and other perfectly recognizable elements in the
ancien régime ðfactions, opinion, and rumorÞ make this reign a particularly
interesting object of study.
We must take into account that “in history, there are neither absolute births nor
absolute declines.”39 The citizens who defined public opinion in 1812 are the
subjects of 1808, who at that time had no more access to information than that
provided by clandestine political rumors and official media. In this sense, it does
not seem unreasonable to suggest the coexistence of an incipient public opinion
and an absolutism in decline. In fact, many authors suggest that public opinion
was “an essential instrument in the hands of the middle classes” to put an end
to the ancien régime.40 We therefore accept that, during an intermediate period
such as that discussed here, terms such as “public opinion,” “official propa-
ganda,” and “popular rumor” can go hand in hand.41
With regard to the Spanish eighteenth century, with its gradual expansion of
the press and social institutions, allusions to the concept of public opinion on the
39 Javier Fernández Sebastián, “Política antigua—política moderna: Una perspectiva
histórico-conceptual,” in La naissance de la politique en Espagne:Mélanges de la Casa de
Velázquez, ed. María Victoria López-Cordón and Jean Philippe Luis, n.s., 35, no. 1 ð2005Þ:
165–81.
40 Javier Fernández Sebastián, “Opinión pública, prensa e ideas políticas en los orí-
genes de la Navarra contemporánea,” Príncipe de Viana 50, no. 188 ð1989Þ: 575–640,
589.
41 “There has been no lack of specialists who wonder if rumors may be considered a
manifestation of public opinion. The question takes on important dimensions in periods
of crisis or revolution, and singularly so during the French Revolution of 1789.” Luis
Miguel Enciso Recio, “Opinión pública, periodismo y periodistas en la época de Felipe V,”
in Felipe V y su tiempo: Congreso internacional, ed. Eliseo Serrano Martín ðZaragoza,
2004Þ, 2:549–96, 553.
communities, societies, and peoples whose members maintain relationships among them-
selves ðhorizontal relationshipsÞ; in every community, there has always existed some sort
of authority which imposes itself, which is accepted, or which directs the population
ðvertical relationshipsÞ; between rulers and the ruled, even in the most authoritarian
regimes, some sort of communication ðpolitical communicationÞ can be detected; and
although in some societies it has been poor or exercised by a minority, there has always
existed the possibility of ½political opposition, and participation in public affairs”
ðCándido Monzón, La opinión pública, 15Þ.
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12 Calvo Maturanapart of historians multiply,42 even though the Spaniards of that era did not in-
clude it in their vocabulary with a meaning similar to that used today until the
last quarter century, later than in France and, especially, in England.43 In 1737,
the Diccionario de autoridades contrasted the word “opinion” to the “truth”44
ðas the current Diccionario de la Real Academica Española ðDRAEÞ contin-
ues to do45Þ; but subsequent eighteenth-century Spanish dictionaries gave the
word other meanings and related it to other terms, which implied a certain value
judgment that was not necessarily arbitrary, as is commonly assumed. We may
further observe that the expression hacer opinión ðto make or form opinionÞ im-
plied prestige, credibility, and leadership: “to be a man whose judgment serves
as an authority on any subject.”46 But the DRAE lags behind the daily use of
the language;47 hence it is necessary to consult other sources in order to trace
out the evolution that produced the gradual generalization of the term and con-
cept of public opinion.48
During the first half of the Spanish eighteenth century, numerous authors
used the word “opinion” as a synonym for “error”—among them Father Fei-
42 Regarding the reign of Philip Vof Spain, which almost spanned the first half of the
eighteenth century, see Teófanes Egido,Opinión pública y oposición al poder en la España
del siglo XVIII (1713–1759) ðValladolid, 2002Þ; Luis Miguel Enciso Recio, “Prensa y
opinión pública,” in Historia de España fundada por Ramón Menéndez Pidal. XIX. La
época de los primeros Borbones, ed. José María Jover Zamora ð1985Þ ðvol. 2, La cultura
española entre el Barroco y la Ilustración ½ca. 1680–1759, 195–258Þ; and Eva Velasco
Moreno, “Proyectos y obstáculos para la formación de la opinión pública en la España de
principios del siglo XVIII,” in Serrano, Felipe V, 2:613–26.
43 “The term ‘public opinion’ of course exists in the 1770s and 1780s, and it is possi-
ble that it might be traced to an even earlier period” ðNigel Glendinning, “Cambios en el
concepto de opinión pública a finales del siglo XVIII,” Nueva revista de filología Hispá-
nica 33 ½1984: 157–64, 159Þ. In France it appears in the second half of the century, and
in the ’30s in England ðM.Ozouf, “L’opinion publique,” in The Political Culture of the Old
Regime, ed. K.M. Baker ½Oxford, 1987, 1:419–34Þ. For the French case, see K.M. Baker,
Au tribunal de l’opinion: Essais sur l’imaginaire politique au XVIIIe siècle ðParis, 1993Þ.
44 “Opinion ½dictamen, feeling, or judgment formed regarding a thing, ½although there
is evidence to the contrary” ðDiccionario de la lengua castellana, 1737Þ.
45 Diccionario de la lengua española ðMadrid, 2001Þ.
46 “Opinion ½dictamen or judgment made regarding something questionable”
ðDiccionario de la lengua castellana, 1737Þ.
47 I have not found the term “public opinion” in any edition prior to that of 1925,
which defines it as “feeling or judgment ½estimación regarding certain matters upon
which people in general agree” ðDiccionario de la lengua española ½Madrid, 1925Þ.
48 Glendinning, “Cambios en el concepto de opinión”; Javier Fernández Sebastián, “The
Awakening Public Opinion in Spain: The Rise of a New Power and the Sociogenesis of a
Concept,” in Opinion, ed. P. E. Knabe ðBerlín, 2000Þ, 211–30; López-Escobar, “La
opinión pública”; or Claude Morange, “Opinión pública: Cara y cruz del concepto en el
primer liberalismo español,” in Sociabilidad y liberalismo en la España del siglo XIX:
Homenaje al profesor Alberto Gil Novales, ed. J. F. Fuentes and L. Roura i Alinas ðLleida,
2001Þ, 117–46.
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The Debate on Public Information in Spain 13joo,49 the Benedictine monk whom many consider to have begun the Spanish
Enlightenment. Feijoo dedicated his first speech, Voz del pueblo ðVoice of the
peopleÞ, “to demonstrating the falsehood of the aphorism Vox populi, vox
Dei.”50 But a fundamental transition would take place over the course of this
century: “In the face of Feijoo’s always or almost always isolated voice of
the people, there emerges the ‘democratic’ principle of public opinion as an
expression of the majority point of view, that can only be respected and up-
held.”51
In the Plan de gobierno ðGovernment planÞ of the count of Aranda,52 written
at the behest of the prince of Asturias ðthe future Charles IVÞ in 1781, the public
plays an important role, especially as regards the men chosen to govern, who
should be “persons of good repute” ðsujetos bien conceptuadosÞ and “clearly
favored by public opinion” ðde opinión pública bien sentadaÞ.53 Tardily in
comparison with England or France,54 the term “public opinion,” along with
other terms such as “public” or “general opinion” ðvoz generalÞ, spread through-
out Spain in the seventies and eighties as a synonym for “reputation.”55 In the
latter sense, considering—like the Scottish philosopher Adam Ferguson—public
opinion as equivalent to reputation or moral approbation,56 we could say, for ex-
ample, that public opinion attacked the Spanish queens of the eighteenth century.
49 Father Benito Jerónimo Feijoo ð1676–1764Þ was an essayist whose most important
work, the Teatro crítico universal ð1726–40Þ, is considered by many authors to be the
most influential of eighteenth-century Spain and the starting point of the Spanish Enlight-
enment.
50 Pedro Álvarez de Miranda, Palabras e ideas: El léxico de la Ilustración temprana
(1680–1760) ðMadrid, 1992Þ.
51 Ibid., 581.
52 Pedro Abarca de Bolea, Count of Aranda ð1719–98Þ. Notwithstanding his position as
a member of the high nobility, Aranda actively served in the Bourbon administration and
army. Among other positions, he was president of the Council of Castile, Spanish
ambassador in Portugal and France, and secretary of state. Though he continued to be a
convinced absolutist, his education and contact with the intellectuals of his time made
an Enlightenment man of him. See Rafael Olaechea and José Antonio Ferrer Benimeli,
El conde de Aranda: Mito y realidad de un político aragonés ðHuesca/Zaragoza, 1998Þ.
53 Count of Aranda, “Plan de gobierno ð1781Þ,” in Rafael Olaechea,El conde de Aranda
y el partido aragonés ðZaragoza, 1969Þ, 157–82; see esp. pp. 169–81.
54 T. C. W. Blanning, The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture: Old Regime
Europe, 1660–1789 ðOxford, 2002Þ; K. M. Baker, Au tribunal de l’opinion: Essais sur
l’imaginaire politique au XVIIIe siècle ðParis, 1993Þ; Roger Chartier, Les origines cul-
turelles de la Révolution française ðParis, 1990Þ; Ozouf, “L’opinion publique”; Hamish
Scott and Brendan Simms, eds., Cultures of Power in Europe during the Long Eighteenth
Century ðCambridge, 2007Þ; and James Van Horn Melton, The Rise of the Public in
Enlightenment Europe ðCambridge, 2001Þ.
55 Álvarez de Miranda, Palabras e ideas, 582.
56 María José Canel, La opinión pública: Estudio del origen de un concepto polémico en
la Ilustración escocesa ðPamplona, 1993Þ, 294–95.
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14 Calvo MaturanaBut Aranda’s conception of “opinion”went beyond reputation and approached
that of a collective to be taken into account. “The public is usually the fairest
judge, for it is guided by effects.” Therefore, the “sovereign has only the public as
his voice and his reference, which can open his eyes . . . it must be the scale . . .
through it he will learn when he is in good or bad standing with his ministers,
and why.” The king must seek out the public in order that his secretaries may
not deceive him. It would be desirable for an incantation to exist that might
take each prince down “chimneys to tertulias ½social gatherings, generally of
an intellectual nature to the taverns, where he might hear private speech ½el len-
guaje privado”; thus would he discover the sycophants who betray him, and
listen to his vassals.57
According to Aranda, the public is made up of the population as a whole,58
millions of subjects who opine and to whom the king must listen when they speak
of “good or bad government”; but Aranda was still an aristocrat who clearly
distinguished between the people and the elite ð“all vassals, and even more so
the most distinguished or well informed, love and venerate their King and
Lord”59Þ. Given that Aranda spent so many years as ambassador in Paris, it is
not surprising to find echoes of Rousseau in the importance he bestows on the
“general voice” ðvoz generalÞ, even if he does so in a kingdom in which the
monarch continues to be “the master,” beyond the reach of any criticism.60
It is possible that Aranda’s boldness could be attributed to the handwritten,
confidential nature of his text. As a general rule, printed works continued to as-
sociate “opinion”with popular error. “Opinions” represent bad habits ðmalas cos-
tumbresÞ, which it was the government’s duty to change. Therefore, people’s
opinion ðla opinión del puebloÞ is not active but passive, and it does not directly
intervene in government; rather, it is the government that must intervene in it,
in the interest of the common good. This is the perspective of various authors
with ties to the Bourbon administration, whom we will discuss in the next sec-
tion.
For all followers of Enlightenment ideals—let us consider Kant—the people
inhabited a nonage from which they must be removed. Once general education
was instituted, the economist Francisco Cabarrús affirmed, “you will see, amidst
57 In the words of Aranda, the public is an element that the sovereign should strive to
please and to attract. A bad secretary takes credit for what pleases the public and blames the
king for unpopular measures: “If the public favors a certain issue, ½bad secretaries
appropriate it as the product of their own idea; if the public is hostile to it, they blame it
on the Lord of them all” ðAranda, “Plan de gobierno,” 169Þ.
58 “The public is the mass recipient of everything that is done, and without the whole
of the mass that provides men, Sciences, Arts, crops, assets . . . what would the Sov-
ereign be? The public family recognizes him as their Father; it respects him; it sweats
for him, devotes itself to him; it dedicates lives, honor, property to him; and it is made
up of many millions of vassals” ðibid., 175Þ.
59 Ibid., 176.
60 Ibid.
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The Debate on Public Information in Spain 15the conflicting passions and disagreements, the shining torch of public opin-
ion, which will safely guide you.”61 But adherents to Enlightenment ideals were
not democratic; they merely strived to persuade the people to let themselves be
better governed and to comply with the reforms necessitated by the times—hence
the aforementioned European debate on the advantages and disadvantages of
deceiving the people.62 In the ancien régime, more than the “voice of the peo-
ple,” one might speak of “voices for the people.”63
The fundamental word in the evolution of the term “public opinion” is “public.”
It was the prestige of an elite known as the “public” that made its opinion into a
qualified judgment immune to the prejudices and superstition attributed to the
people. The term “public” ðel públicoÞ began to represent a “respectable” group
that was considered superior to the “people” ðel puebloÞ; the latter term was of-
ten used as a synonym for the lower classes ðel vulgoÞ.64 Feijoo himself, in his
speech on the “voice of the people,” contended that “the worth of opinions
must be measured according to their weight, not by the number of souls.”65 This
assertion has the same spirit as the one expressed by José María Blanco White
nearly a century later.66 In relating the uprising against the French occupation
of Madrid on May 2, 1808, Blanco White refers to the “intense popular outcry”
ð fuerte grito popularÞ which, “although it may have expressed the feelings of
the majority, does not merit the name of public opinion.”67 Effectively, “when
the power of public opinion emerges, defined as the superior authority before
which all individual opinions should be presented, its distinction with respect
61 Francisco Cabarrús, Elogio de Carlos III. Rey de España y de las Indias, leído en la
Junta General de la Real Sociedad Económica de Madrid de 25 de julio de 1789 por
el socio D. Francisco Cabarrús, del Consejo de S. M. en el de Hacienda ðMadrid, 1789Þ,
48–49.
62 Lucas, ¿Es conveniente engañar al pueblo?
63 María Victoria López Cordón, “‘Vox populi’: Guerra, propaganda y representación
de dinastías,” inGobernar en tiempos de crisis, ed. José Manuel Nieto and María Victoria
López-Cordón ðMadrid, 2008Þ, 307–35, 335.
64 An anonymous letter addressed to Aranda in 1792 differentiated between the love
of an elite or a public for its king and the attitudes displayed in popular gossip: “Your
Excellency’s birth and talents inspire trust in the public . . . ½which is angered nowa-
days as it cannot bear with patience that it is said, ‘there goes the one who sleeps with
the queen, the poor King doesn’t deserve it’” ðArchivo Histórico Nacional ½Madrid ½here-
after AHN, Estado, leg. 2.858Þ. We can deduce from this that the public did not like the
people’s commentaries about the king.
65 Cited by Glendinng, “Cambios en el concepto de opinión,” 157.
66 José María Blanco-White ð1775–1841Þ was a Spanish journalist of liberal leanings
who, despite having been educated in absolutist Spain, carried out the majority of his
literary activity in England, where he settled in 1810. SeeMartinMurphy, El ensueño de la
razón: La vida de Blanco-White ðSeville, 2011Þ.
67 Ignacio Fernández Sarasola, “Opinión pública y ‘libertades de expresión’ en el
constitucionalismo español ð1726–1845Þ,” Historia constitucional (revista electrónica) 7
ð2006Þ.
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16 Calvo Maturanato popular opinion becomes essential.”68 Along these lines, liberal Spaniards of
the nineteenth century associated public opinion with the educated, landed
elite, the true bearer of national sovereignty.69
In order for public opinion to become the guiding “torch” of government, there
must first be a unified, critical public that concerns itself with political affairs.
Nevertheless, absolute monarchs exclusively tolerated the existence of a liter-
ary—rather than political—public. The king presided over the Republic of Let-
ters, but the public formed its parliament. The most faithful reflection of this
abstraction may have been that seen in controversies surrounding the reform
of the theater.70 Worried about the morality promoted by baroque cloak-and-
dagger comedies, the government directly supported a neoclassicist intellec-
tual minority during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, but it also al-
lowed a debate in the form of reviews in print, satires, and polemics between
opposing factions, intervening only when the discussion became excessively
heated. Other polemics, such as those surrounding smallpox inoculation, the
Spanish translation of the Bible, the refutation of the famous article by Masson
de Morvilliers,71 and the authenticity of the apparitions of Saint James before
the Spanish armies fed the interest of a public that would soon also take an
interest in politics. This literary and scientific public is a clear predecessor of
the political one.
Although the public is a vaguely defined group—as late as 1832, the journalist
Larra wondered who they were and where they could be found72—we can
consider the eighteenth-century public to have been made up of the military, li-
terati, businesspeople, clergy, members of the administration, and aristocrats. It
could be found in centers of social activity, both official ðroyal academies, eco-
nomic societies ½sociedades económicas, universities, etc.Þ and informal ðter-
tulias, cafés, public plazas, etc.Þ.
As regards official centers of social activity, the proliferation throughout Spain
of the Associations of Friends of the Country ðSociedades de amigos del paísÞ,
institutions in which urban elites met with the objective of promoting the com-
mon good and in which they were not seated in order of rank but in the order in
which they arrived at the meeting, greatly fomented the notion of citizenship. In
the funeral eulogies read to honor their members in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, the nation progressively displaces the king, and subjects
68 Chartier, Les origines culturelles, 43.
69 José María Blanco White, Cartas de España ðSeville, 2004Þ, 316.
70 René Andioc, Teatro y sociedad en el Madrid del siglo XVIII ðMadrid, 1987Þ.
71 In 1782, Nicolas Masson de Morvillier’s critiques in the “Spain” entry of the En-
cyclopédie métodique provoked strong responses throughout the country, both positive
and negative.
72 Mariano José de Larra, “¿Qué es el público y dónde se encuentra?” ð1832Þ, in
Artículos de costumbres ðMadrid, 2006Þ, 75–85.
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The Debate on Public Information in Spain 17make way for citizens.73 For their part, the various academies propagated the
new message of the Bourbon monarchy, in which the king gradually substituted
his sacred image with that of the patriotic first citizen.74
As for the unofficial centers of social activity,75 perhaps the best known and
most studied are the tertulias, where egalitarian dialogue was established among
participants and contrasting opinions were debated in an atmosphere of toler-
ance.76 In turn-of-the-century Spain, the best-known tertulia is that of the Count-
ess of Montijo,77 which dissolved after the “Jansenist” group fell into disgrace;
but there were many others that concerned authorities with their propensity to
comment on political affairs. A report of the Secret Commission ðComisión
reservadaÞ, a body formed in 1791 to spy on the conversations of the people of
Madrid, El Escorial, and Aranjuez, includes a specific allusion to these meetings:
“The commissioners shall attempt to gain entry into the homes of the Ambassa-
dors, dispatched from all the courts, as well as into those of all the grandees of
Spain, and into any others where tertulias are held, to determine what is dis-
cussed there, what class of people they are, if they are preparing to fight, or to
talk.”78
Toward the end of the century, sources testify to the importance of cafés. These
locales favored the sociability of the middle classes. They were more sophisti-
cated than taverns but of less restricted access than tertulias ðalthough they did
not provide the same degree of privacyÞ.79 In his Letters from Spain, Blanco
White alluded to the proliferation of cafés during the period studied here, and
80Jovellanos underscored the importance of the activities carried out in them,
73 Antonio Calvo Maturana, “Cuando manden los que obedecen”: La clase política e
intelectual de la España preliberal (1780–1808) ðMadrid, 2013Þ.
74 Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, Fragmentos de monarquía: Trabajos de historia polí-
tica ðMadrid, 1992Þ.
75 See Van Horn Melton, The Rise of the Public.
76 Benedetta Craveri, The Age of Conversation ðNew York, 2005Þ.
77 Paula de Demerson, María Francisca Sales de Portocarrero, Condesa de Montijo:
Una figura de la Ilustración ðMadrid, 1975Þ.
78 “Instrucciones para los comisionados de Madrid,” dated January 4, 1791 ðAHN,
Consejos, leg. 9.383Þ.
79 J. Fernández Sebastián, “Los primeros cafés en España ð1785–1809Þ: Nueva socia-
bilidad urbana y lugares de afrancesamiento,” in La imagen de Francia en España durante
la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII, ed. J. R. Aymes ðParís, 1996Þ, 65–82; andMaría Victoria
López-Cordón, “Diversión, orden público y acción política: Los cafés madrileños en
1791,” inEstudios en homenaje al profesor Teófanes Egido, ed.MáximoGarcía Fernández
and María de los Ángeles Sobaler Seco ðValladolid, 2004Þ, 1:345–62.
80 Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos ð1744–1811Þ, writer and magistrate, was possibly the
most influential and prestigious of Spanish Enlightenment thinkers of the fin de siècle. He
served in many positions in the Bourbon administration ðattaining that of Secretary of
Grace and Justice ½Gracia y Justicia in 1797Þ and was a member of many cultural in-
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18 Calvo Maturanasuch as “the reading of public papers and periodicals” or “instructive conversa-
tions and conversations of general interest,”which, in addition to offering “honest
entertainment to many persons of integrity and good judgment . . . also instruct
those youth that, neglected by their families, receive their education outside the
home, as it is commonly said, in the world.”81
On the street, as has been noted, the Spanish discussed the news of the day.
Along with recurrent rumors, we see that events in France—and their conse-
quences—were making a place for themselves, lending a truly political character
to such conversations. An example of this is to be found in a letter from Pedro
Estala to his friend Juan Pablo Forner, describing the state of turmoil in Madrid
in 1794:
When you come, if you do, this little world will be unknown to you. . . . Everyone has
thrown themselves into politics; they speak of nothing but news, reforms, projects
½arbitrios, etc. . . . Even the lads on the street corner buy the Gaceta. . . . Beside ½the
statue of  Mariblanca ½at the Puerta del sol and in the café, you hear talk of nothing but
battles, revolution, the Convention, national representation, liberty, equality; . . . even ½the
prostitutes ask you about Robespierre and Barrère, and it is essential to throw in a good
dose of newspaper rubbish to humor the girl that you’re courting.82
It is necessary to mention another type of interpersonal communication that
doubtless fomented the exchange of ideas: correspondence. One need only con-
sult the epistolary exchanges of enlightened characters of the age, such as the
ambassador Nicolás Azara, the prestigious writer and politician Gaspar Melchor
de Jovellanos, the playwright Leandro Fernández de Moratín, the poets Manuel
Quintana and Juan Meléndez Valdés, or the cleric and journalist José María
Blanco White, to confirm that it was a fundamental means of communication in
which the correspondents expressed themselves sincerely and spontaneously, in
a somewhat freer manner than that allowed by the restrictiveness of the printed
word.
In the correspondence of Jovellanos, we find numerous allusions to public
opinion and to the public as a general voice of authority.83 In this vein, Jovel-
lanos confessed to his friend Carlos González de Posada that he hoped public
81 Gaspar Melchor Jovellanos, Memoria sobre espectáculos y diversiones públicas
ðMadrid, 1998Þ, 196–97.
82 Pedro Estala to Juan Pablo Forner, Madrid, ca. 1794, in François Lopez, Juan Pablo
Forner y la crisis de la conciencia española en el siglo XVIII ðValladolid, 1999Þ, 502.
83 Nevertheless, at a moment in which this concept was still being formed, Jovellanos
also occasionally used the term “public opinion” as synonymous with “reputation” or even
with generalized error ðas in the first of his series of letters to GodoyÞ.
stitutions of the period. There exists a highly extensive bibliography on this figure; see,
e.g., José Miguel Caso González, Jovellanos ðBarcelona, 1998Þ; Javier Varela, Jovella-
nos ðMadrid, 1988Þ.
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The Debate on Public Information in Spain 19opinion would support his Informe sobre la ley agraria ðReport on the agrar-
ian lawÞ so that the government would be obliged to put it into practice: “I hope
to completely fulfill my desire, which is only that it be read everywhere, and that
its principles thus shape public opinion, the only arbiter that might some day
provide for its establishment, given that it has no place in the current ideas of our
golillas ½ jurists.”84 The influential Enlightenment thinker Campomanes,85 upon
congratulating Jovellanos for his appointment as Secretary of Grace and Justice,
spoke of the “general acceptance with which his appointment has been received
by the public.”86
In another manuscript—the draft of an essay, rather than a letter—Jovellanos
set out his thoughts on public opinion, or “the opinion of the greatest mass of
individuals of the social body,” to which he granted the ability to judge the
government and influence its decisions. In contrast with liberals, Jovellanos—in
line with Enlightenment ideals—aspired to establish universal education so that
a real public opinion might exist, for “where there is no education, there is no
public opinion, because ignorance holds no resolute opinion; and the few that
are educated, well or poorly, impose their own opinion upon those who do not
have one.” For this Enlightenment thinker, the elite does not define public opin-
ion, but it controls it, taking advantage of the ignorance of the many who end
up “at the mercy ½arbitrio of the few.” Without naming them directly, he ac-
cused the nobility and the clergy of using the admiration of the people to mo-
bilize them with their “erroneous opinions.”87
Consequently, in late eighteenth-century Spain, there was a self-recognized
public—one that differentiated itself from the ignorant people. Although the
84 Jovellanos to Carlos González de Posada, Gijón, January 20, 1796, in Obras com-
pletas de Jovellanos. III. Correspondencia ðOviedo, 1986Þ, no. 855, 195. However, in the
Report, Jovellanos refers to “½public opinión” as an “obstacle to be overcome”
ðGlendinning, “Cambios en el concepto de opinión,” 161Þ. Golillas was a pejorative
reference to a group of the lower nobility that studied law at university and worked in the
administration of the kingdom; the term is derived metonymically from the collars ðgolaÞ
they wore.
85 Pedro Rodríguez Campomanes ð1723–1802Þ was a magistrate and intellectual who
occupied various influential positions within the Bourbon administration ðuntil he became
the head of the Council of CastileÞ, where he was always a strong partisan of reformism
and the rights of the Crown. In 1780, the king granted him the title of Count of Cam-
pomanes. His important role in the institutions protected by the monarch should also be
noted, especially in the Royal Economic Society of Madrid of the Friends of the Country,
and in the Royal Academy of History ðReal Sociedad Económica Matritense de Amigos
del País and the Real Academia de la HistoriaÞ ðdatabase Fichoz, no. 000709Þ.
86 Campomanes to Jovellanos, Madrid, November 23, 1797, in ibid., no. 1.130, 356.
87 Due to the modern sense in which Jovellanos uses this concept, it is believed that
this draft cannot predate 1790. See Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, “Borrador de reflex-
iones sobre la opinión pública,” in Obras completas de Jovellanos. XI. Escritos políticos
ðOviedo, 2006Þ, 15–17.
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20 Calvo MaturanaCrown did not recognize this politically and culturally elite public as an equal
interlocutor, it was forced to interact with it in order to rule the kingdom. In the
next pages, we will see how enlightened thinkers ðmany of whom were mem-
bers of the government, as well as of the publicÞ perceived the relationship
between the sovereign and the public. How should authorities use the virtual
monopoly over propaganda and the literary market? Should the king inform the
public? Was it in the interest of absolute power for public affairs actually to
become “public”?
The Political Advantages of Informing the Public
The debate over abolishing or attenuating the practice of royal secrecy arose in
absolute monarchies because it could be considered on pragmatic rather than
moral grounds. Spanish intellectuals in the period examined in this article were
more interested in the ways communication could benefit the effective power
of the king and the state than in notions of ethics and justice. In the majority of
cases, these enlightened thinkers—though preliberal stirrings may be discerned
in some of them—were faithful adherents to absolutism.
One of the benefits the king could obtain by diminishing his hermetic behavior
was the establishment of a more trustworthy voice, which would increase his
moral authority over his vassals. A policy based on active communication with
the people and ostensible transparency rather than the repression of rumors and
pamphlets was the most effective means of imposing a single vision of events.
In the periodical Correo de los ciegos de Madrid ð1786–91Þ, the military ser-
viceman and author Manuel Aguirre88 showed his sympathy for Necker’s ideas
con publishing State expenditures. The administration’s lack of transparency
ended up making vassals into “enemies of the government” out of sheer ig-
norance. “What good is opacity or mystery in the affairs of public administra-
tion?” asked Aguirre. Using instruments such as the theater and the printing
press, the government should communicate “with its people,” as this was the
best way “to correct bad habits and give proper direction to individual educa-
89tion and opinions.”
88 Manuel Aguirre ð1747–1800Þ was a member of various institutions that enjoyed
the protection of the monarchy, such as the Royal Basque Society of Friends of the
Country ðReal Sociedad Vascongada de Amigos del PaísÞ and the Royal Academy of
History ðReal Academia de la HistoriaÞ ðdatabase Fichoz, no. 009584Þ. His works are
compiled in Manuel Aguirre, Cartas y discursos del Militar Ingenuo al Correo de los
ciegos de Madrid ðSan Sebastián, 1973Þ.
89 Manuel Aguirre, “Discurso sobre la conveniencia de educar al pueblo para gobern-
arlo mejor,” Correo de Madrid 167 ð1788Þ: 955–58. The speech has no title; the one
included here appears in Francisco Aguilar Piñal, Bibliografía de autores Españoles del
siglo XVIII ðMadrid, 1981–2001Þ.
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The Debate on Public Information in Spain 21Without a doubt, the press was a direct means of access to the only public
whose opinion counted.90 Between 1789 and 1790, two candidates hoping to
replace Ramón de Guevara as editor of the Gaceta de Madrid ðMadrid gazetteÞ,
the official periodical of the monarchy,91 issued statements regarding how they
would improve the operation of the periodical as a political instrument.92 The
second candidate’s statement is of particular interest, because it calls for greater
official transparency in the “News of the Kingdom” section of the Gaceta.93
Information about disasters should not be concealed from the Spanish people,
given that “every time some public event transpires, the people are puzzled by
the silence of the Gaceta.” According to the author, La gazette de France did
not proceed in this way; rather, “it never omits such events, nor others of any
sort, as calamitous as they may be.” The statement mentioned two recent cases
in which news had been denied to readers of the Gaceta de Madrid due to a
lack of media transparency: the fires of the Plaza Mayor ðMadridÞ and of the
ship Brillante ðat CartagenaÞ.94
This candidate’s proposal reveals a Spanish public that demands trustworthy
news. Although this public “must content itself with whatever is given to it, it
complains of the silence, and this complaint results in the discredit of the Gaceta
and the least of its dispatches.” Silence undermines the credibility of the peri-
odical and detracts from the information it does contain. If the reader knows
that the official news outlet does not report news accurately and hides many
things, he will seek out other sources, breaking the king’s attempted monopoly
95on information.
90 Francisco Aguilar Piñal, La prensa española del siglo XVIII: Diarios, revistas y
pronósticos ðMadrid, 1978Þ; P. J. Guinard, La presse espagnole de 1737 à 1791: Forma-
tion et signification d’un genre ðParis, 1973Þ; Alejandro Pizarroso Quintero, “La prensa en
España y en Europa a caballo entre dos siglos: Panorama comparado,” in 1802: España
entre dos siglos, ed. Antonio Morales Moya ðMadrid, 2003Þ, 3:295–320; Inmaculada
Urzainqui, “La república periodística al filo del 800,” in Morales, 1802. España entre dos
siglos, 3:321–50.
91 It was virtually the only newspaper not closed down after the French Revolution.
92 “Sobre mejorar la Gaceta de Madrid,” Madrid, January 26, 1789, in AHN, Con-
sejos, leg. 11.280, exp. 6.
93 The author’s name does not appear in the document.
94 “Algunas apuntaciones sobre los auxilios de que necesita la Gazeta de Madrid y
las mejoras de que es susceptible,” Madrid, November 29, 1790, in AHN, Consejos,
leg. 11.280, exp. 6.
95 The canon Juan Escoiquiz expressed the same opinion in a statement submitted in
1795 to the secretary of state, Manuel Godoy: “When some disastrous event transpires, the
People hear the bad news so manipulated by the timid or the malevolent that they become
disheartened, and it is necessary to avoid this by making it known to them, in some of the
aforesaid papers and without a moment’s hesitation, that the loss is not so great” ðAHN,
Estado, leg. 3.237, exp. 5Þ.
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22 Calvo MaturanaEven though the only permitted nonliterary daily was the Gaceta, some au-
thors tried to offer the public an alternative. In 1794, the cleric Joaquín Traggia
presented the Ministry of State ðSecretaría de estadoÞ with a proposal for a
newspaper entitled El desengañador político ðThe political truth-tellerÞ.96 With
this journal he hoped “to make known to the people the evils that necessarily
accompany every democracy and aristocracy.” The applicant believed that there
was no way to keep the people ignorant of what was happening in France ð“it
is not possible to completely prevent them from drinking the poison of evil
doctrines”Þ and suggested that it would be better for the public to be well in-
formed by the government than for it to feed on information leaked to it by
enemies of the Crown. To rival the clandestine revolutionary campaign rather
than ignoring it would provide “the firmest and most robust support for our
constitution, and an immovable base for the Spanish Throne.”97 Traggia’s
proposal was rejected.
But credibility was not the only potential benefit arising from a more com-
municative political practice. Intervening in people’s opinions could improve
their attitudes toward legislation and their day-to-day obedience.98 For Enlight-
enment thinkers, the reformation of people’s opiniones depended on the gov-
ernment, just as did channeling rivers or building roads. This point of view
stands out especially in Francisco Cabarrús’s Sobre los obstáculos de opinión y
el medio de removerlos ðOn the obstacles of opinion and the means of removing
themÞ,99 which begins with a commentary on how hard it is to “make man see
and act according to his true self-interest.” Previously, in his Elogio a Carlos III
ðPraise for Charles III, 1789Þ, Cabarrús had argued that it was very much in the
interest of a good king to educate his people, in order to create a trustworthy
96 Father Joaquín Traggia ð1748–1802Þ was an academic and librarian of the Royal
Academy of History and a member of the Royal Basque Society of Friends of the Coun-
try ðdatabase Fichoz, no. 026515Þ. See María Asunción Arija Navarro, La Ilustración
aragonesa: Joaquín Traggia (1748–1802) ðZaragoza, 1987Þ.
97 AHN, Estado, l. 3.248.
98 “Could I but succeed so as to afford new reasons to every man to love his prince, his
country, his laws; new reasons to render him more sensible in every nation and govern-
ment of the blessings he enjoys, I should think myself the most happy of mortals. Could I
but succeed so as to persuade those who command, to increase their knowledge in what
they ought to prescribe; and those who obey, to find a new pleasure resulting from obe-
dience—I should think myself the most happy of mortals” ðMontesquieu, The Spirit of
Laws, “Preface”Þ.
99 Francisco Cabarrús ð1752–1810Þ was a French businessman, merchant, economist,
and diplomat residing in Spain. He played a key role in the founding of the Bank of San
Carlos ðpredecessor of the current Bank of SpainÞ. As a reward for his service, he was
granted the title of Count in 1789. See Ovidio García Regueiro, Francisco de Cabarrús:
Un personaje y su época ðMadrid, 2003Þ.
This content downloaded from 149.157.1.188 on Wed, 8 Oct 2014 06:09:37 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Debate on Public Information in Spain 23public opinion that—from an evidently liberal point of view—could eventually
guide him.100
Another enlightened writer committed to reshaping the opinion of the Span-
ish was Juan Pablo Forner.101 In his speech Amor de la patria ðLove for the
homeland, 1794Þ, he noted that the government was powerless, reforms were
in vain, and the population did not obey new laws ð“the laws have varied, but
the old customs and opinions resist change”Þ. Despite the official attempts to
turn old, chivalric Spain into a mercantile nation rather than a military one, the
fact was that “we want business, but loathe the businessman; we want agri-
culture, and diminish the farmer.”102 Thus, according to Forner, the first task
of government should be to change “the public and general opinions,” as it
is those opinions that “make nations happy or unhappy.”103 The people’s as-
sumption of a norm was far better than employing thousands of police to en-
force their compliance with it. AManual for Princes from the period speaks of
the many sovereigns who, “sincerely ½desiring the well-being of their vassals,”
had been unable to achieve it since the latter were not “well informed about
their obligations, nor the manner of fulfilling them.”104
Attempting to demonstrate that the lack of information only generated disobe-
dience, some authors—followers of the trend established by Cesare Beccaria’s
Dei delitti e delle pene ðOn crimes and punishmentsÞ—contended that the best
means of getting the people to obey the monarch’s legislation was to explain it
to them. The governments of Charles IV were aware of this and used the power
of church influence.105 During those years, priests went one step further in their
legitimization of royal power and put themselves at the service of civil leg-
100 Francisco Cabarrús, Elogio de Carlos III. Rey de España y de las Indias, leído en
la Junta General de la Real Sociedad Económica de Madrid de 25 de julio de 1789 por
el socio D. Francisco Cabarrús, del Consejo de S. M. en el de Hacienda ðMadrid, 1789Þ,
48–49.
101 Juan Pablo Forner ð1756–97Þ was a writer and magistrate, as well as a member of
various cultural institutions. He eventually became fiscal, or public prosecutor, for the
Council of Castile. See François Lopez in his Juan Pablo Forner et la crise de la con-
science espagnole au XVIII siècle ðBourdeaux, 1976Þ.
102 Juan Pablo Forner, Amor de la patria: Discurso que en la junta general publica que
celebra la real Sociedad económica de Sevilla el día 23 de Noviembre de 1794 leyó
ðSeville, 1794Þ, 51–53.
103 Ibid., 52–53.
104 “Manual de príncipes o máximas para la felicidad de un Estado,” in Jaime Albosía
de la Vega, El amigo del príncipe y de la patria o el buen ciudadano; traducido del fran-
cés y dedicado a los Excelentísimos Señores Grandes de España, a los Ilustrísimos títulos
de Castilla, y demás Señores y Caballeros de la Nación Española ðMadrid, 1788–89Þ, 2:139.
105 Antonio Calvo Maturana, “Aquel que manda las conciencias . . .”: Iglesia y
adoctrinamiento político en la monarquía Hispánica preconstitucional (1780–1808)
ðCádiz, 2011Þ.
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24 Calvo Maturanaislation. Sermons and pastorals defended controversial decisions, such as the
requirement that cemeteries be established outside cities, the introduction of
vaccinations, or the crackdown on contraband.106
The diplomat and writer Valentín de Foronda,107 another adherent to the ideals
of the Enlightenment and a fervent proponent of recognizing the need to inform
the people in order to govern them better, discussed this issue throughout his
work.108 Necker’s influence is evident in Foronda’s effort to publish a comparison
between Spanish and English accounting records in an attempt to boost confi-
dence in the economy of his country.109 With respect to contraband, Foronda
explained in a speech that this crime “wreaked havoc on agriculture, industry,
navigation, and commerce” and that it was, in sum, a vice contrary to the well-
being of the entire nation.110 Like a good Enlightenment thinker, he believed
that the education of the individual, beginning in very early childhood, was the
best system; but what to do with adults? How might their “erroneous opinions”
be combatted?
The pulpit was important, but it was insufficient. To this “spiritual weapon”
Foronda added secular ones related to public opinion. “In Spain,” he wrote,
“where it is generally believed that contraband does not constitute theft from
the public, but a mere violation of or disobedience to the law of the Sovereign,”
executed smugglers were, in the eyes of the people, “victims of the whims of
106 Contraband was a major problem for the authorities of the period. See José Luis
Bermejo Cabrero, “Dos aproximaciones al contrabando en la España del Antiguo Régi-
men,” Cuadernos de historia del derecho 4 ð1997Þ: 11–59; and Miguel Ángel Melón
Jiménez, Los tentáculos de la hidra: Contrabando y militarización del orden público en
España (1784–1800) ðMadrid, 2009Þ.
107 Valentín de Foronda ð1751–1821Þ fits the profile of the majority of the authors
discussed here: he served the Hispanic monarchy as a diplomat, as a member of official
bodies, and—above all—as the author of works sympathetic to the Bourbon reforms. See
José Manuel Barrenechea, Valentín de Foronda: Reformador y economista ilustrado
ðVitoria, 1984Þ.
108 For example, in his works for the intendentes ðregional administrators of the mon-
archyÞ, he constantly used expressions such as “make clear” ðhaga verÞ, “incline,” “extend,”
“convince them,” “get to the bottom of” ðdesentrañeÞ, “promote,” “praise and distinguish,”
“fill with enthusiasm,” etc. See Valentín de Foronda, “Carta sobre los intendentes,”Espíritu
de los Mejores Diarios . . . , vol. 10, no. 247 ð1790Þ, 394–403; and Valentín de Foronda,
Colección de máximas, preceptos y consejos para los señores intendentes, corregidores y
alcaldes ðMadrid, 1801Þ.
109 Carta en que se prueba que las deudas de España son infinitamente más pequeñas
que las de Inglaterra, que tenemos tantos recursos para pagar nuestra deuda y que por
consiguiente la Gran Bretaña es pobre respecto de la España, 1801. The text is found in
AHN, Estado, leg. 3.238, exp. 16, doc. 10. It is also included in Barrenechea, Valentín
de Foronda ð336–45Þ, and Robert Sidney Smith, “La riqueza de España y de Inglaterra
en 1801,” Boletín: Real Sociedad Bascongada de los Amigos del País 22 ð1966Þ: 3–15.
110 Foronda, “Carta sobre los intendentes,” 394–403.
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The Debate on Public Information in Spain 25authority.” Consequently, harsh laws generated more terror of the monarch
than deterrence of the crime and only inspired “compassion for the criminal.”
This popular reaction proved that “the public” did not think like the legislator.
A law alien to public sentiment was therefore a form of repression rather than
a reform of common custom. Thus, “it would be advisable to explain how the
public should view the crime prior to imposing the punishment, or to make the
punishment proportionate to the crime, in accordance with public considera-
tion.” In this battle over opinión, the king should introduce an explanation of the
evils of contraband into the wording of the law and reduce the punishment,111
making it a crime that stains the honor of its perpetrator and disqualifies him
from holding any honorific position.112 This was not the only occasion on which
Foronda expressed opposition to laws that blatantly disregarded “the opinions
of the people, ½which are a highly respectable matter ½propiedad, even when
they may be erroneous.”113
Responding to this quandary born of the disconnect between law and
common custom, eighteenth-century monarchs attempted to change conven-
tions.114 The third definition of the word “convention” ðconvenciónÞ in the cur-
rent edition of the Diccionario de la Real Academia de la Lengua is: “tacitly
accepted norm or practice, responding to precedent or common custom.”115 The
modification of such conventions is fundamental if a law is to be accepted and
obeyed. Otherwise, the lawmaker must constantly resort to force in order to
uphold the law, and this is the beginning of the law’s delegitimization. We can
trace this argument—so brilliantly elaborated by M. Foucault—among thinkers
116of the ancien régime such as the Italian Nicolo Donato and the Spaniard
111 “In moderate governments . . . a good legislator is less bent upon punishing than
preventing crimes; he is more attentive to inspire good morals than to inflict penalties”
ðMontesquieu, The Spirit of Laws ½1748, 6:9Þ.
112 Foronda, “Carta sobre los intendentes,” 104.
113 Quoted by Robert Sidney Smith, “Valentín de Foronda, diplomático y economista,”
Revista de economía política 23 ð1959Þ: 425–64, 456.
114 Jean Pierre Dedieu employs this term very opportunely in Après le roi: Essai sur
l’effondrement de la monarchie Espagnole ðMadrid, 2010Þ.
115 Diccionario de la Real Academia de la Lengua ðMadrid, 2005Þ.
116 “Any State that resorts to forced obedience degenerates into a lack of proper res-
pect, in addition to the grave harm brought on by the violation ½tortura of the sacred bond
of vassals’ ½voluntary submission to their Prince. Such a State will also see that ½forced
obedience undoes another, equally inviolable bond: the respect that vassals owe to their
Prince, as well as to his decrees and his ministers. It is true that he can use force, and im-
pose punishments, and confiscate the property of the rebellious in order to make them
comply with their duty; but in healing one wound, these violent remedies open up many
others; and in seeing themselves compelled to submit by force, to obey against their will
an obligation from which they were exempt prior to their punishment; although through
their punishment they serve the State, their resulting fear of the State will produce an
aversion toward it, which can only produce tremendous disturbances in such a disas-
This content downloaded from 149.157.1.188 on Wed, 8 Oct 2014 06:09:37 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
26 Calvo MaturanaLázaro Dou.117 As the state’s demands on its subjects increased, it became in-
creasingly reticent about using and making a show of force, something incom-
patible with the paternal image developed by the propaganda of Charles IV.118
Persuasion seemed to be more efficient.
According to absolutist authors, the law ðleyÞ ð“instrument or conduit whereby
public law ½derecho is communicated to the people”119Þ was as absolute as the
monarch.120 For orthodox absolutism, there was no room for concessions if the
law went against common custom. “The laws,” wrote the Count of la Cañada in
1793,121 “receive all their worth from the mouth of the Sovereign,” and vassals,
who are “notoriously inferior . . . are simply to obey.”122 The jurist Lázaro Dou
knew that “according to our royal law ½derecho . . . no custom nor practice ½estilo
in Spain has the force to abrogate the law ½ley”; but he did not seem to agree
entirely with this maxim. Realistically, the famous axiom “it is respected, but not
obeyed” ðse acata pero no se cumpleÞ applied to the majority of laws. Dou fa-
vored the notion that—with the sovereign’s consent—a law could be abrogated
when “it is contravened every day before the eyes and in the presence of the
legislator . . . and this contravention is neither punished, nor the observance of
117 Lázaro Dou, Instituciones del derecho público general de España con noticia
particulardeCataluña y de las principales reglas de gobierno en cualquier Estado ðMadrid,
1800Þ.
118 Time and time again, this king recalled that he had the legal authority to impose
“voluntary” recruitment and loans but that he preferred to give himself over to the
solidarity of his vassals. For example, in the military levy of 1794: “I could and should
use that supreme power and authority ½ facultad granted me by law to demand service
from those of my vassals . . . that are especially suited to the exercise of arms . . . but I
have preferred more equitable and generous means of justice than those stipulated by the
Ordinances and Laws ½Pragmáticas” ðSantos Sánchez, Colección de pragmáticas, cé-
dulas, provisiones, circulares, y otras providencias publicadas en el actual reinado del
Señor Don Carlos IV ½Madrid, 1793, 2:13–17Þ.
119 Dou, Instituciones, 29.
120 The great concern of eighteenth-century jurists was to gather and compile the laws of
the Hispanic monarchy. This concern, which to a certain extent was shared by those in
power, inspired works such as the Novísima recopilación de las leyes de España ½Newest
compilation of the laws of Spain ðMadrid, 1806Þ. On these topics, see the prolific work
of the legal historian José Luis Bermejo Cabrero.
121 Juan Acedo y Rico ð1726–95Þ, a jurist who became governor of the Council of
Castile. In 1789, Charles IV rewarded his service by naming him Count of la Cañada
ðdatabase Fichoz, no. 000006Þ.
122 Juan Acedo y Rico, conde de la Cañada, Apuntamientos prácticos para todos los
trámites de los juicios civiles . . . ðMadrid, 1793Þ, 11.
trous situation” ðNicolás Donato,El hombre deEstado ½Madrid, 1789Þ. SeeDavidA. Bell,
“The Public Sphere and the World of the Law in Eighteenth-Century France,” French
Historical Studies 18, no. 3 ð1992Þ: 912–34; Jeremy L. Caradonna, “The Death of Duty:
The Transformation of Political Identity from the Old Regime to the French Revolution,”
Historical Reflections 32, no. 2 ð2006Þ: 273–307.
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The Debate on Public Information in Spain 27the law renewed.”123 In his recommendations for bringing about compliance
with the law, Dou proposed that laws should be promulgated taking into ac-
count “the customs and inclinations of the subjects.” Laws should be imposed
tactfully, he advised, in such a way that the subjects hardly notice: “The great-
est prudence in legislation consists in preparing things without violence toward
or the repugnance of those that are to obey; in making laws without it seem-
ing that laws are being made, and ordering them by such common, straight-
forward means, that they facilitate one other; whereby considerable, lofty, and
difficult ends are achieved, with no disturbance of regular order.”124
In the periodical El regañon general ðThe general grumblerÞ, we find the same
need to reconcile legislation with opinión in order to achieve observance of and
respect for the law. An adequate moral education would allow public opinion
ð“which is no more than the sum of individual opinions”Þ to drive government,
rather than to burden it.125
The bibliographer Juan Sempere y Guarinos wrote along these same lines.126 In
1797, in response to an official questionnaire, he once again linked people’s
opinion to their compliance with the law. The author favored “public education”
both inside and outside the classroom. He contended that people learn more in
the “universal school of practical customs that is the world” than in the school-
house. Customs should guide “the purpose of the civil constitution, which under
any form of government is none other than public safety, calm, and comfort.”
Before addressing the means of improving state-regulated education, Sempere—
who was prosecutor in the Royal Chancery of Granada—alluded to the need for
the government to persuade the public to uphold the law.127
The example Sempere uses is, once again, contraband: “the hydra; the most
horrific, monstrous, and prolific of vices, abuses, and recklessness.” The author
denounces the state’s inability to control this plague with patrols of riflemen and
troops, in spite of whom contraband “neither ceases, nor is diminished; rather it
123 Dou, Instituciones, 49–50.
124 Ibid., 36. This notion of dissimulating power in order for measures to be effective
recalls a famous maxim of government: “that the effect be achieved without the effort
being noted” ðque se consiga el efecto sin que se note el cuidadoÞ.
125 “Concluye la educación particular,” El regañón general 18 ðJuly 30, 1803Þ, 137–39,
139.
126 Juan Sempere y Guarinos ð1754–1830Þ was a jurist, author, academic, advisor, and
friend of the country. For more on this author, see Juan Rico Giménez, De la Ilustración
al liberalismo: El pensamiento de Sempere y Guarinos ðAlicante, 1997Þ; and Rafael
Herrera Guillén, Las indecisiones del primer liberalismo español: Juan Sempere y Guar-
inos ðMadrid, 2007Þ.
127 Juan Sempere y Guarinos, “Informe dirigido al Príncipe de la Paz sobre la educa-
ción del Reino” ð1797Þ, in Joaquín Rico Giménez, “Godoy y Sempere y Guarinos,” in
Manuel Godoy y su tiempo, ed. M. A. Melón, E. La Parra, and T. Pérez ðMérida, 2003Þ,
2:265–86.
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28 Calvo Maturanagrows, it multiplies, it affronts and triumphs over the power of a great monarch;
it demonstrates contempt for the troops, it intimidates the People, and makes
Justice tremble.” Contraband was deadly not only for the economy but also for
“public education,” since it made fraud more attractive in the eyes of the people
than “honorable daily work.” Sempere definitively tied the opinión ðsmugglers
were admired by the peopleÞ to legislation ðwithout just laws, the people would
disobey a government whose coercive methods would never be sufficientÞ.128
Clearly these authors were strongly influenced by optimistic enlightened confi-
dence in education.
We will close this section with the poet and magistrate Juan Meléndez
Valdés.129 The inclination to win over the public to the policy of the monarchy
stands out especially in the report on hospicios ðshelters for the poorÞ that he
completed in 1802. Meléndez partially blamed the failure of these establish-
ments, which were supposed to provide an officially sanctioned alternative to
church alms, on their “mysterious government . . . the public is not informed
through news or printed accounts of investment in them, of their copious in-
come, of the poor whom they support, of the aid that is given them, of the in-
struction that they provide, the assistance that they offer, etc.” The nation is
unaware of the utility of such shelters “because care has not been taken to make
½their usefulness known.” Thus “the opinión is indifferent, or divided against
itself”—a grave error, for without popular support “no public establishment can
prosper.”130 Like Foronda, Meléndez advocated using the church as a conduit
for channeling general opinion in favor of the hospicios: “get the clergy in-
volved, that they may expound upon their innumerable benefits from the pulpit
and the confessional, and how agreeable their benefactors are to the state and to
religion, each of which so highly recommends charity and beneficence.”131 The
author repeatedly insisted on the need to “win over” and “sway” public opinion
by informing the public, illuminating “the nation with good writings” on the
utility of these shelters.
128 Ibid., 278.
129 Although he is better known as the most important of Spanish neoclassical poets,
Juan Meléndez Valdés served as magistrate under Charles III and Charles IV, as well as
under José I Bonaparte as State Advisor. He is the subject of an abundant body of work,
especially in the literary sphere. For a historical focus, see Antonio Astorgano Abajo,
Biografía de D. Juan Meléndez Valdés ðBadajoz, 2007Þ.
130 “Fragmentos de un discurso sobre la mendiguez dirigido a un ministro, en el año de
1802, desde la ciudad de Zamora con ocasión de darle gracias por haber conseguido de él
una orden para que fueran admitidos en aquel hospicio diez niños desvalidos que había
recogido el autor” ðFragments of a discourse on panhandling addressed to a minister, in
the year of 1802, from the city of Zamora, giving him thanks for having obtained an order
to admit to that refuge ten defenseless children that had been taken in by the authorÞ, in
Meléndez, Obras, 1133–48, 1134.
131 Meléndez, “Fragmentos de un discurso,” 1135.
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The Debate on Public Information in Spain 29Meléndez is also the author of a revealing complaint addressed to the Coun-
cil of Castile in 1798, which he signed as prosecutor of the Court of Magis-
trates of the Royal House and Court.132 A supply problem had made it neces-
sary to raise the price of wine, and the Court of Magistrates had drafted a
lengthy public notice in which it explained the reasons for the price increase.
The Council of Castile had shortened the text, however, publishing a meager
notice that announced the increase without providing explanations that could
have eased discontent ðsuch as the necessity of the increase or the rationale for
a tax on wine as a nonessential productÞ.133
The offendedMeléndez put his obedience before his individual opinion, but he
could not refrain from bemoaning “the inconstancy he had assumed in the public
eye” by accepting the shorter version of the announcement, when the full text
would have taken “a step forward in illuminating the People” about the matter.
The measure, he thought, was necessary and just, and the longer announcement
would have corrected the population’s erroneous belief that cheap prices are
always in its best interest, making it aware of “the need that it is in, that we are
all in, of suffering the effects of abundance or of shortfall.” The author went so
far as to speak of “the right of the public” to face the facts ðsalir del desengañoÞ,
contending that keeping the masses “in the dark” has “dire consequences.”
Meléndez believed as well that a well-informed people is more obedient than
one simply commanded to obey the law: “May Justice and the Public Adminis-
tration be always frank and truthful, and they will make even the man who hears
the evidence and resists it ðsay what one willÞ bow his head and venerate the
same hand that punishes him, just as he venerates Justice not only when it re-
wards him but also when it pursues and disciplines the miscreant.”134
Thus far, we have considered the theories of various authors who wrote on
the topic of communication ðunidirectional, top-down communication, as is to
132 Sala de Alcaldes de Casa y Corte, the institution in charge of the government and the
administration of justice in Madrid.
133 “Informe sobre la postura del vino,” in Meléndez, Obras, 1163–64. The opposite
stance—of hermetism and silence—is found in the political treatises of the ancien régime.
In this sense, the words of the baroque author Diego Saavedra Fajardo are significant:
“When resolutions are made public, they seem composed and organized according to fine
judgment. They represent the Majesty and prudence of the Prince; we understand them to
be motivated by causes and considerations that are beyond us, and we sometimes attri-
bute to themmany causes that they did not in fact have. If we were to overhear the conclave
½conferencia, the grounds and intentions ½for such resolutions, we would laugh. Thus it
happens in the theater, where actors appear in costume and in character, and inspire res-
pect; whereas there, in the dressing room, all is confusion and chaos, and their vileness is
evident. It is therefore greatly imprudent for the mysteries of government to be commu-
nicated to strangers” ðDiego Saavedra Fajardo, Idea de un príncipe político y cristiano
representado en cien empresas ðLXIIÞ, quoted inMariano Baquero Goyanes, Visualidad y
perspectivismo en las “Empresas” de Saavedra Fajardo ðAlicante, 2010Þ.
134 Baquero, Visualidad y perspectivismo, 1164.
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30 Calvo Maturanabe expected from the ancien régimeÞ between power and the public at the end of
the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. We have seen that a break
with the official policy of silence could be made from various angles—by ex-
plaining laws to improve compliance with them, for instance, or by providing
national and international political news to give the public an official version
of events. In each case, the result is the same: the dismantling of secrecy, the
progressive breakdown of the administrative silence that characterized the ab-
solute monarchies, which had traditionally been limited to monarchic propa-
ganda combining the cult of the monarch and the divine origin of his power,
which legitimated everything. We will now consider how the Crown acted when
faced with the many problems that emerged during the period when these works
were written.
The Practice of Power
It was never to the liking of absolute power for political matters to be debated
outside the government sphere. The baroque Spanish tradition encouraged public
spectacles and appearances135 endorsed by the political authors of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries,136 including Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, an author of
international renown who wrote in 1640:
We would lose the opinion that we have of Princes and Republics, if we were aware of
what transpires within their Councils. They are giants who appear great and powerful to
the observer, and they inspire fear more than they offend; but if fear examines them ½si los
reconoce el miedo, they are revealed to be fantasies, governed and sustained by men of
no greater stature than the rest. Empires that are secretive in their councils and designs
inspire respect; others, contempt. . . . The grandeur conceived by opinion is lost in plain
137view. Reverence is greater from a distance.
135 José Antonio Maravall, 1975.
136 There is an abundant bibliography on political practice ðstate, monarchy, etc.Þ in the
early modern age in Europe in general and in the Iberian monarchies in particular that
exceeds the scope of this study. See Peter Burke, The Fabrication of Louis XIV ðNew
Haven, CT, 1992Þ; Bartolomé Clavero, Tantas personas como estados: Por una antropo-
logía política de la historia europea ðMadrid, 1986Þ; Darnton, “An Early Information
Society”; Domínguez, Sociedad y estado; Fernández Albaladejo, Fragmentos de monar-
quía; AntonioM. Hespanha,Vísperas del Leviatán: Instituciones y poder político ðMadrid,
1989Þ; Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political
Theology ðPrinceton, NJ, 1957Þ; José Antonio Maravall, Estado moderno y mentalidad
social (siglos XV a XVII) ðMadrid, 1972Þ, 2 vols.; Maravall, La cultura del Barraco;
Monod, The Power of Kings; I. A. A. Thompson, “Castile,” in Absolutism in Seventeenth-
Century Europe, ed. J. Miller ðNew York, 1990Þ, 69–98; Francisco Tomás y Valiente,
Gobierno e instituciones en la España del antiguo régimen ðMadrid, 1982Þ; and Max
Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology ðNew York, 1968Þ.
137 Diego Saavedra Fajardo, Idea de un príncipe político y cristiano representado en
cien empresas ðLXIIÞ, quoted in Baquero, Visualidad y perspectivismo.
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The Debate on Public Information in Spain 31This same attitude was inherited and sustained by the monarchs of the eigh-
teenth century. Hence it was not novel that in 1744 Philip V should order “the
Council to abstain from licensing publications relative to matters of State, peace
treaties, and other such documents.”138 Political matters, raisons d’état, were
completely excluded from literary production; the only authorized version was
the official one. In 1767, in the decree expelling the Jesuits, Charles III refrained
from explaining his motives for such a traumatic decision, merely stating that it
was a consequence of his “royal wishes” ðreal ánimoÞ and forbidding discus-
sion of the matter.
The case of the Hispanic monarchy is especially interesting since in the years
subsequent to the French Revolution censorship became radicalized and all un-
official periodicals were shut down, making centralized power the only source
of news and information. Control over the written word was extremely strict, and
the Bourbon state became “Foucaultian,” transformed into a vigilant Argos.139
But the press did not cease production, and other media—such as the pulpit or
the theater—became, more than ever, instruments of civil power.
Today, historiography has broken with the traditional image of the reign of
Charles IV as reactionary and hermetic, rightly considering it to be the turning
point of the Spanish Enlightenment.140 It was evident that the elite that had, in the
course of the century, become accustomed to reading the press ðsome of which,
such as the periodical El eensor,141 was rather progressive for the timeÞ and
gathering in centers of social activity ðsuch as tertulias, cafés,142 academies, or
the Royal Economic Societies of Friends of the CountryÞ143 was not going to
settle for reading royal orders, public announcements, and the anodyne news
provided by the Crown in the Gaceta de Madrid. This broad group could not be
144governed as though they were the biggest part of the third estate.
138 Novísima recopilación de las leyes de España ðMadrid, 1806Þ, libro 8, título 16,
ley 17.
139 Conde Naranjo, El Argos.
140 Francisco Sánchez-Blanco, La ilustración Goyesca: La cultura en España durante el
reinado de Carlos IV (1788–1808) ðMadrid, 2007Þ.
141 F. Uzcanga, ed., El censor ðBarcelona, 2005Þ.
142 María Victoria López-Cordón Cortezo, “Diversión, orden público y acción polí-
tica: Los cafésmadrileños en 1791,” inEstudios en homenaje al profesor Teófanes Egido,
ed. Máximo García Fernández and Ma de los Ángeles Sobaler Seco ðValladolid, 2004Þ,
1:345–62.
143 Gloria Á. Franco Rubio, “Captar súbditos y crear ciudadanos, doble objetivo de los
‘Amigos del País’ en el siglo XVIII,” Historia social 64 ð2009Þ: 3–23.
144 It would be inexact to say that the absolute monarchs ignored the common people. In
daily life, in lesser political affairs, it was in the best interest of every government—
absolutist as it may have been—to take the pulse of the population to know if the people
were happy or, to the contrary, if they were restless. The spies of the Secret Commission
ðComisión ReservadaÞ were also charged with determining “whether or not the Public
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32 Calvo MaturanaWe can appreciate from various handwritten, confidential manuscripts that
power began to be conscious of the existence of that nonerudite public interested
in the news of the day. A censor, the Count of Isla, rejected the publication of the
newspaper El desengañador político ðThe political truth-tellerÞ on the grounds
that it might fall into the hands of those curious “idle youth,” hungry for news,
that “devour the newspapers.” The count referred to this group as the “public,”
which he located in “the tertulias, cafés, shops, bookstores . . . the great amphi-
theater in which these athletes present themselves, and it is there that the news-
papers offer material for them to make an ostentatious display of themselves.” A
gazette focused on political affairs would “open the door to censure and insults,
for with the pretext of the periodical, their boldness might grow, leading them
to speak with impunity and ponder the irreparable evils of the Monarchy.”145
It is not surprising that the English ambassador Alleyne Fitzherbert, accus-
tomed to the parliamentary debates in his own country, should speak in 1790 of
the “little weight that the public voice has in this country, if it opposes the
authority of the Crown.”146 In the space of a decade, Charles IV defied his entire
court by making a member of the Royal Guard into a grandee of Spain, Prince
of Peace, and Generalísimo; he then persisted in keeping him in power in spite
of his growing unpopularity. This suggests that this monarch took absolutism to
the extreme, disregarding the opinion of the most hostile sectors of the elite; but
that does not mean that he governed completely at his own whim. Popular sen-
timent mattered greatly, and that of the elite even more so.
Kings were not indifferent to the criticism and opinions within their king-
dom, which made their way to their secretaries and councils in the form of
147anonymous letters and denunciations. In 1798, Godoy saw “the Government
145 AHN, Estado, leg. 3.248
146 Fitzherbert to Leeds, Escorial, October 28, 1790, National Archives ðLondonÞ,
Foreign Office, 72/19.
147 Nor could they be indifferent to another form of external opinion: the perception of
the economic solvency of the country. “Credit” was essential for getting loans abroad
and selling promissory notes ½vales at home; therefore, official propaganda aimed at fo-
menting the economic confidence fundamental to good credit ðThomas E. Kaiser, “Money,
Despotism, and Public Opinion in Early Eighteenth-Century France: John Law and the
Debate on Royal Credit,” Journal of Modern History 63 ½1991: 4–16; and López-Escobar,
“La opinión pública”Þ.
resents any Government decisions” ðAHN, Consejos, leg. 9.383; “Instrucciones para los
comisionados de Madrid,” dated January 4, 1791Þ. This attitude, rather than an expression
of respect for public opinion, represents the classical fear of the people, always regarded
as a bomb on the verge of going off. In 1800, Godoy confessed to the queen: “the voice of
the populace horrifies me, and I fear the vigor of the people when they do not recognize
authority” ðGodoy to María Luisa, May 1800, in Cartas confidenciales de la reina María
Luisa de Parma y de don Manuel Godoy ½Madrid, 1935, 289Þ. Scorn for the so-called
vulgo, the irrational masses to whom it was not necessary to provide explanations, but
merely sustenance and entertainment, prevailed in absolutist governments.
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The Debate on Public Information in Spain 33discredited, andMajesty offended, in the convulsions of public sentiment, mod-
esty failing to restrain foul and atrocious rumors.”148 Certainly Charles IV ap-
proached different court factions at different times, often in response to na-
tional and international pressure: for instance, the magistrates of the count of
Floridablanca, the nobles of Aranda, the enlightened followers of Gaspar Mel-
chor de Jovellanos, or the conservative party of José Antonio Caballero. Ac-
cording to the soldier Ignacio Garciny, Charles IV did not replace Floridablanca
sooner because “in the beginning, they did not dare to clash so openly with
public opinion.”149 The diplomat José García de León y Pizarro recounts that the
introduction of Enlightenment thinkers ðFrancisco Saavedra, Miguel Azanza y
Gaspar de JovellanosÞ into the cabinet in 1797 was the result of advice that
Cabarrús gave to Godoy: “that he win public opinion, putting people of
reknown in high positions.”150 But it would soon become more urgent to
placate the anti-Jansenists, to the detriment of the enlightened cabinet, whose
membership—after a few years of support from Godoy—would pass over to
the opposition. In 1801, from exile, Jovellanos would remind Charles IV that
the injustice from which he was suffering affected all Spaniards. The idea of a
court that judges political acts—call it public opinion, or call it the nation—
was in the air: “I implore, my lord, Your Majesty’s mercy, not only for me, but
for my nation; for there is no respectable man in the nation unaffected by my
redress. The oppression of my innocence threatens his, and the violation of my
liberty puts all my compatriots in danger, and makes them wary.”151
Information control was even more important for the monarchy than legitimiz-
ing and making understood changes within the government.152 The example of
greatest interest, that of filtering the news of national and international political
affairs allowed to reach the Spanish, was the cordon sanitaire around revolution-
ary France, which demonstrates both the efforts and the limitations of the state
under the ancien régime: undesirable texts, as well as works supposedly con-
trolled by state censorship, continued to slip through. The government wanted
direct control over all information disseminated about the great news event of
148 Godoy to María Luisa, September 24, 1798, in Pereyra, Cartas confidenciales, 189.
149 Ignacio Garciny, Quadro de la España desde el reinado de Carlos IV . . . ðValencia,
1811Þ, 10.
150 José García de León y Pizarro, Memorias ðMadrid, 1998Þ, 67.
151 Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, “Segunda representación de Jovellanos a Carlos IV
ð8/10/1801Þ,” in Obras completas de Jovellanos. XI. Escritos políticos, 608–9.
152 A citation from Floridablanca from 1791 corroborates this attempt to manipulate
the information that reached the streets: “This news having spread, and having informed
the Assembly of it and of our need to defend and ready ourselves, we will avoid suspi-
cion among our people and the people of France, and make our people take interest in the
measures to be taken to defend their lives and property” ð“Informe autógrafo que leyó al
rey en el año 1791 el conde de Floridablanca,” in G. Anes, Economía e Ilustración en la
España del S. XVIII ½Barcelona, 1969, 185Þ.
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34 Calvo Maturanathose years. The so-called “Floridablanca panic”153 constituted an attempt to
proceed as though nothing had happened on the other side of the Pyrenees. In
the Gaceta de Madrid “the Revolution simply does not exist . . . until 1793”: the
editors feigned normality in all the information they provided about France.
Beginning that year ðwhen the war made dissimulation impossibleÞ, the period-
ical began making reference to French politics, but—logically—from the coun-
terrevolutionary point of view, painting that country as a hotbed of ambition,
conspiracy, and executions.154
After an announcement was published in the Correo literario de Murcia
ðLiterary post of MurciaÞ about the publication of a work entitled Vida y muerte
de Luis dieciséis ðLife and death of Louis XVIÞ, the royal orders of June 7 and
17 and July 28, 1798, urged the Council of Castile to “take the greatest care in
½their watchfulness and scrupulousness that no news, either favorable or ad-
verse, of any things pertinent to the Kingdom of France, be published in any
paper or book.”155 It was forbidden to speak not only of events in France but
also of what was transpiring in Spain in connection with France, “to prevent
the Public from being given truncated or erroneous news.” Central power at-
tempted to remove all information related to France from the public sphere, for-
bidding even antirevolutionary works such as the aforementioned panegyric to
Louis XVI or a Defensa de los reyes por derecho natural y divino ðDefense of
kings according to natural and divine lawÞ;156 as late as 1803, the publication of
the laudatory Vida de María Antonieta de Austria ðLife of Marie Antoinette
of AustriaÞ was refused.
This policy was the one that frustrated Joaquín Traggia’s project El desenga-
ñador político ðThe political truth-tellerÞ. Although proposals for works contrary
to revolutionary maxims were common at that time, Traggia had defended his
with solid arguments; thus, his idea was not immediately rejected with the rest.
The secretary of state, Manuel Godoy, noted in the margin that “although it has
been believed, until now, that it is advantageous to maintain silence regarding
the rights of Sovereignty . . . I see that the present plan may be appropriate, pro-
vided that the author does not diverge in any way from what he has proposed.”
Godoy forwarded the proposal to the censors, and thanks to this we have a re-
port from the Count of Isla dated February 13, 1795, in which he details the
reasons for the proposal’s rejection. He contended that it was best not to touch
153 This alludes to the radicalization of civil and inquisitorial censorship carried out by
the minister Floridablanca to avoid the spread of the French Revolution. See note 15.
154 Alberto Gil Novales, “La Revolución Francesa a través de la Gaceta de Madrid,” in
Estudios dieciochistas en homenaje al profesor José Miguel Caso González ðOviedo,
1995Þ, 1:347–64.
155 AHN, Estado, leg. 3.235, exp. 13.
156 Proposed in December 1795 by Ignacio María de Funes Ulloa. Godoy, in the mar-
gin: “may his zeal be appreciated, and may he be told that these writings are not advis-
able” ðAHN, Estado, leg. 3.840, exp. 19Þ.
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The Debate on Public Information in Spain 35on these debates, for they served “more to unsettle the spirits ½ánimos than to
enlighten them.” There are things that the people should not know, that should
be forbidden to them, as unattainable as a deity: “To write about the Monarchy
in the current circumstances, to inspire horror in the public regarding govern-
ment affairs, is to draw people’s attention to news that it is not appropriate for
them to scrutinize; it is to awaken him who sleeps and, finally, to compel ½the
public to think about a matter that it is not advisable for them to consider, and
which for them should be a sacred mystery.”157
But the French Revolution was not an isolated case in the Crown’s efforts to
establish a monopoly on public information. In 1790, Spaniards remained un-
aware of the fact that the Nootka crisis had brought them to the brink of war
with England. The Gaceta de Madrid provided news on English combat ma-
neuvers without in any way associating them with Spain, and only once an ac-
cord had been reached can we read that “the unresolved differences that this
Cabinet had with Spain, which had been, in great part, the motive for our arma-
ment” had been settled.158
At any rate, it was very difficult to control information leaks. Many lesser
publications ðaround ten pages in lengthÞ escaped the strictest censorship and
went into circulation. One of Floridablanca’s subalterns, upon observing the
rapid dissemination of a Romance o relación de los terremotos de Orán ðRo-
mance or account of the earthquakes in OranÞ noted that: “This rag is printed in
Cartagena, and if so many copies arrived in Alcalá, how many must have scat-
tered throughout the kingdoms of Murcia, Valencia, and Andalucía, where
the lower classes enjoy such reading! I understand that these writings are gener-
ally forbidden; if this is so, the order is either insufficiently conveyed, or it is
disobeyed, which is worse.”159
Nothing was to undermine the official information monopoly. On Decem-
ber 16, 1791, Charles IV informed his vassals in a curious fashion of the loss of
the North African stronghold of Oran. Following the earthquake that destroyed
the fortress, his enemy, the king of Mascara, had besieged it; but the Spanish
troops had valiantly resisted. In spite of it all, the king, in a pretended paternal act,
had voluntarily decided to abandon the fort rather than putting pride before the
blood of his men.160
Let us consider another example: the case of the human and material catastro-
161phe provoked by the rupture of the Lorca ðMurciaÞ dam on April 30, 1802.
157 AHN, Estado, l. 3.248.
158 Calvo Maturana, “Génesis del II Imperio Británico,” 159.
159 Quoted in Fermín de los Reyes Gómez, El libro en España y América: Legislación y
censura (siglos XV–XVIII) ðMadrid, 2000Þ, 1:661.
160 National Archives ðLondonÞ, Foreign Office, 72/23.
161 “The speed with which the construction was completed, and the pharaonic dimen-
sions of the project, could perhaps be considered a symptom of technical precariousness.
In 1802, eleven years after its construction, a deluge of water caused by excessive pre-
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36 Calvo MaturanaTwo weeks later, before Charles IV had spoken publicly on the matter, the au-
thorities discovered that a printed extract was for sale from a Carta escrita en la
ciudad de Lorca ðLetter written in the city of LorcaÞ, which had been published
without permission and without a license. The surprise was twofold, for the
work had been announced in the Diario de Madrid ðMadrid dailyÞ on May 13;
so this announcement was the first allusion to the floods that many Spaniards
and residents of Madrid were able to read.162
The Council of Castile ordered the immediate recall of all printed copies of
this letter, as well as an investigation into how it had been published without a
license and how it came to be announced in the Diario de Madrid. The doc-
umentation is extensive, but it can be summarized with two names. The first
is that of the printer, Ramón Ruiz, who admitted to having published the let-
ter in order to free himself from the economic crisis in which the printing in-
dustry was stagnating as a result of the war. Ruiz defended his decision based
not only on his need for money to support his family but also on his own opin-
ion of the work, which he had read “without even remotely thinking that this
publication was prejudicial in any way, for it contains no clause that either di-
rectly or indirectly maligns either the Region or the State.”163 If Ruiz had acted
in bad faith, knowingly breaking the law, another man, the censor Pedro Estala,
had committed a grave error by allowing the announcement to be included in
the Diario de Madrid without first having verified that it had been granted the
necessary licenses. An anonymous writer from Lorca, a printer from Madrid,
and an insufficiently zealous censor had effectively thwarted Charles IV’s pre-
ventive system.
This event troubled authorities for two reasons. First, not even the most
innocuous work should escape the control of state censorship. Second, a clandes-
tine pamphlet had informed the public of the event before the Crown itself had
been able to compose an official message. The text was eight pages long and
its contents alarmist ðor realistic, depending how one looks at itÞ, emphasizing
the human tragedy ð“here nobody sleeps, nor eats; all is confusion and shock”Þ
and including such details as the names attached to corpses and specific
addresses in the city of Lorca where havoc had been wrought ð“the reservado
162 AHN, Consejos, leg. 5.565, exp. 40.
163 Ibid. The printer was eventually fined ten ducados.
cipitation caused the dam to burst, laying waste to the region and part of the city of Lorca,
with a total of over seven hundred victims.” Antonio T. Reguera Rodríguez, Territorio or-
denado, territorio dominado: Espacios, políticas y conflictos en la España de la ilustra-
ción ðLeón, 1993Þ, 69. On this public work, see Juan Hernández Franco, Antonio José
Mula Gómez, and Joaquín Gris Martínez, Un tiempo, un proyecto, un hombre, Antonio
Robles Vives y los pantanos de Lorca (1785–1802) ðMurcia, 2002Þ.
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The Debate on Public Information in Spain 37½tabernacle of San Cristobal has been found swimming in the middle of the
nave, for the water reached the cornice”Þ.164
It is impossible to know how Charles IV would have proceeded in the absence
of this clandestine testimony. We cannot rule out the possibility that he would
have maintained administrative silence, given that the article published in the
Gaceta ðon May 14, 1802Þ appeared after the publication in question and con-
tains allusions to illegal versions of the event. The official announcement is ad-
dressed to the “public, lest it be frightened by vague and exaggerated accounts.”
The brief text can be divided into three parts. The first lines attribute the dam’s
existence to Charles III’s “munificent spirit” and concern for supplying the arid
soil of Murcia with water. After seeing plans for a canal frustrated, the “royal
treasury” assumed the cost of building two reservoirs in the region, and in their
construction “all measures dictated by the greatest prudence were taken in order
that these great structures were made with the greatest skill and safety.”165
Next, we find in the Gaceta article a narrative of the rupture of the reservoir,
which had been in use since 1787 “without any breach having been detected in
it.” At approximately 3:30 in the afternoon on the thirtieth of April, a cracking
sound was heard, which gave way to an outpouring of water that “at the speed of
thought” flooded “the cultivated fields ½huerta of Lorca, an entire neighborhood
of this city, and all the low-lying land along the Segura River, up to the city of
Murcia.” The Gaceta’s version is rather less alarmist than that of the confiscated
letter. Although it describes the speed and violence of the flood “that swept
along behind it everything in its path” and mentions the destruction of the
neighborhood of San Cristóbal, it nuances the most apocalyptic versions of the
disaster: “a good number of people died . . . although not in such great numbers
as the first rumors of this ill-fated event could lead one to believe.”166
Third and last, the official article relates the measures taken by Charles IV in
response to the disaster. “As soon as the disagreeable news of this calamity
reached the ears of the King, his paternal heart was grief-stricken by the mis-
fortunes it had caused, and since that moment he has been constantly occupied
providing aid to the poor wretches that the flood has left without homes and
without property.” The authorities of the region ðthe corregidores of Murcia
and Lorca and the bishop of CartagenaÞ had received “the riches that they have
167had on hand ½to provide relief , in greater quantity than had been requested.”
164 “Extracto de una carta recibida de la ciudad de Lorca, cuyo contenido expresa los
estragos que ha ocasionado el rompimiento del pantano que se hallaba entre las Sierras
inmediatas a dicha ciudad,” in ibid.
165 Gaceta de Madrid 39 ðMay 14, 1802Þ, 469.
166 Ibid., 469–470.
167 Ibid., 470.
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38 Calvo MaturanaIn this way ðin this and subsequent issues of the Gaceta168Þ, the ministers of
Charles IV attempted to counteract clandestine information, addressing “the
public”169 in recalling the philanthropic aims of the reservoir, denying its defi-
cient construction, revising the most pessimistic versions of the event, and pub-
licizing the king’s pain and his palliative measures. Other works addressing the
disaster of the Lorca reservoir were published,170 some of which had no known
editor or place of publication and may have been brought out clandestinely.171
One of them was denounced to the Inquisition.172 It is notable that one of these
works, the Nuevo y curioso romance ðNew and curious romanceÞ, was addressed
to the “curious reader.”
If information control is necessary in every totalitarian system, every kind of
government shares the need to enforce the law. It was not easy for the absolute
monarchs to maintain a balance between their sacred hermeticism and the
propagandistic needs demanded by reformism. One need only review the cen-
sorship records to observe that there were lingering reservations about the pub-
lic knowing “too much.” The following invaluable citation from the censor
Francisco Pérez de Lema is revealing. In his view, the king should not lower
himself by giving reasons for compliance with his orders:
To wish, however, that by order of the King, a book be distributed among his vassals to
move them to comply with their obligations, with no urgent cause or motive that could
authorize it in other, more proper terms, is to ill-advisedly wish to taint and even destroy
168 Four days after the official announcement, the curious could also purchase a
“geometric map of the reservoir of Lorca ½Plan geométrico del pantano de Lorca”
ðGaceta de Madrid 40 ½May 18, 1802, 484Þ. In another issue, the king announced new
funds destined for the victims, as well as a public fund for contributions “so that all the
Spaniards that have the means and are not devoid of compassion contribute to the succor
of those in Lorca who have suffered so much.” Pursuant to a royal order of May 24, 1802,
a relief council was created, presided over by the bishop of Cartagena; the announcement
of said council is not much less tragic than that of the confiscated text ðGaceta de Madrid
58 ½July 20, 1802, 701–2Þ. One year after the flood, the public fund was remembered for
the small amount of money that had been collected ðGaceta de Madrid 41 ½May 24,
1803, 431Þ.
169 This allusion “to the public” is repeated in another announcement related to the same
issue in the Gazette on July 20, 1802. The mention is twofold, for the end of the text about
the relief council promises a future accounting of expenses “to satisfy the public.”
170 A la triste noticia de la repentina é inesperada avenida del Segura, acaecida en la
noche del 30 de abril, en este año de 1802, entre diez y once de la noche, a causa de
haberse roto uno de los pantanos de Lorca, por cuyo motivo, se vio la ciudad deMurcia en
la mayor confusión y conflicto ðMurcia, n.d.Þ.
171 Nuevo y curioso romance, en que se da cuenta y declara las lamentables desgracias
acaecidas por haber reventado el Pantano de la ciudad de Lorca, y haber desolado todo
cuanto encontró hasta entrar en la mar como lo verá el curioso lector: acaecida esta
desgracia el día 30 de abril a las cuatro de la tarde de este año de 1802 ðn.p., n.d.Þ.
172 I am referring to the Cantos fúnebres sobre la inundación de los pantanos de Lorca.
The record is to be found in AHN, Inquisición, leg. 4.459, exp. 19.
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The Debate on Public Information in Spain 39his sovereign authority, which does not precisely depend on the just motives with which
he exercises it or its subsequent examination and approval, but on the reverent opinion
and ready will that his subjects should have to execute whatever they are ordered to do,
firmly persuaded that he will not order them to do anything that is not necessary or con-
ducive to their well-being and happiness.173
But this hermetic stance began to fall into disfavor, notably in the official at-
titude regarding certain measures related to public health for which official public
opinion campaigns were always openly waged. At the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury and the beginning of the nineteenth, public announcements, periodicals,med-
ical treatises published by the Royal Printing House, and sermons were riddled
with allusions to the advantages of burying the deceased outside the cities,174 of
collaborating with preventive measures against yellow fever, and of being inoc-
ulated or, later, vaccinated against smallpox.175 Of course, the official motivations
were not merely philanthropic: epidemics were slowing the increase of the
Spanish population, so necessary for the strengthening of the state.
Let us pause to consider the last of these three examples: the fight against the
deadly smallpox epidemic. The first known means of fighting the illness, in-
oculation, awakened suspicion in some European countries due to the moral
quandary it presented: a slight risk of death for the patient who received the vi-
ral inoculation and of contagion for those who surrounded him. In Spain, the
treatment did not become widespread until the final third of the eighteenth
century. After decades of controversy that was not only moral and religious but
also scientific—doctors themselves were not in agreement about the matter—
official media began to disseminate favorable news about the positive effects of
the treatment in Spain and the rest of Europe. In 1792, Charles IV took a stand
for science by receiving doctor Timoteo O’Scanlon,176 author of an Ensayo apo-
logético de la inoculación ðApologetic essay on inoculationÞ, at the court.177 In
1798, the royal family decided to lead by example—and to take precautions,
given that the disease had attacked various family members throughout the cen-
178 179tury —inoculating the prince, infantes, and infantas.
173 Francisco Pérez de Lema to Príncipe de la Paz, Madrid, November 28, 1796, AHN,
Estado, leg. 3.247, exp. 7.
174 Reguera, Territorio ordenado, 244–47.
175 Antonio Rumeu de Armas, “La inoculación y la vacunación antivariólica en España
ðdatos para la historia de la medicina española en los siglos XVIII y XIXÞ,” inDe arte y de
historia ðMadrid, 2004Þ.
176 “Timoteo O’Scanlan presenta a sus Majestades Ensayo apologético de la inocula-
ción,” Gaceta de Madrid 87 ð1792Þ, 767.
177 Madrid, 1792.
178 Luis I had died of smallpox in 1724. In 1788, the infante Gabriel, his wife, and his
son died of the same illness.
179 “Madrid, 23 de Noviembre de 1798: Se ha procedido a la inoculación de la viruela a
los príncipes,” Gaceta de Madrid 94 ð1798Þ, 1004–5.
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40 Calvo MaturanaThat same year, the vaccine developed by the Englishman Edward Jenner was
introduced. This time, the Hispanic monarchy was among those most engaged in
the discovery, promoting vaccination campaigns on both sides of the Atlantic.180
Charles IV’s attempt to convey the importance of the vaccine to the general pop-
ulation without resorting to anything beyond paternal suggestion is striking.
There is abundant documentation for this: for example, in February of 1802, the
captain general of Catalonia was asked not to compel the population to be vac-
cinated, on the grounds that “it would be useless and even risky to take other
measures that would inevitably result in the resistance of some, who would
spread divisiveness, and the crucial purpose of inoculation would be aban-
doned.” To the contrary, it was advised that he use “persuasion, to make them see
the prodigious effects promised by this practice, and that they run no risk with the
procedure.”181
The authorities knew that information was much more useful than force, but
they also knew such information had to be credible. In 1801, the Royal Academy
of Medicine of Barcelona had authorized the publication of a text opposing the
vaccine, a work by the French doctor Alphonse Le Roy. The academy “believed
it was fitting that the public educate itself regarding opinions both favorable
and contrary to the vaccine, in order that they see that nothing was being hidden
from them nor any attempt being made to deceive them.” But another doctor
pressured the regent and the work was not published. The academy complained
to the king that with this suppression, “the practice of this new inoculation had
become suspicious in the public eye.”182 Academics considered the censorship of
this work to be inconsistent with the monarch’s policy on public information, and
they let their feelings be known. Public opinion was forged under the ancien ré-
gime in disputes such as this, in which those in power permitted debate as long
as it benefited and supported their point of view.183
Even in strictly political matters, we can perceive a clear shift toward the end of
the Spanish ancien régime. Charles IV, moved by a loss of authority or by the
desire to increase it, tended to distance himself from traditional hermeticism.
Whether lying or telling the truth, raising consciousness or manipulating it, what
180 There exists an ample body of work addressing the application of the vaccine in the
Hispanic monarchy, especially surrounding the two hundredth anniversary of the Balmis
Expedition. Prior to these commemorations, we also have the doctoral thesis of Susana
Ramírez Martín ð1999Þ and its reedition: La salud del Imperio: La real expedición
filantrópica de la vacuna ðAranjuez, 2002Þ. See also José Tuells and Susana Ramírez,
Balmis “et variola” ðValencia, 2003Þ; and Susana Ramírez, Luis Valenciano, Rafael
Nájera, and Luis Enjuanes, eds., La real expedición filantrópica de la vacuna: Doscientos
años de lucha contra la viruela ðMadrid, 2004Þ.
181 AHN, Estado, l. 3.215-2.
182 Ibid.
183 This is evident in the case of the theater, the first public recognized by the ancien
régime. See René Andioc, Teatro y sociedad en el Madrid del siglo XVIII ðMadrid, 1987Þ.
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The Debate on Public Information in Spain 41is certain is that the Spanish Crown embarked on the conquest of public opin-
ion. We have seen that toward the end of the eighteenth century and at the be-
ginning of the nineteenth, many of those in service to the Crown had accepted
a paradox: to be absolute one must not be arbitrary, and the more the monarch
accommodated public opinion, the easier it was to get the public to obey. This
opinion won over Charles IV and Ferdinand VII, at least in the desperate cri-
sis of 1807 and 1808.
At the end of the reign of Charles IV, everyone was talking about the affairs of
the monarchy—“even the muleteers,” as Lady Holland wrote.184 The effects of
the economic crisis and the war were compounded by the partido fernandino, a
political party led by the prince and heir to the throne ðthe future Ferdinand VIIÞ
and made up of a good part of the high nobility and the church, which began to
erode the image of the monarchs and their right-hand man, Godoy, through satire
and rumors185 ðrepresenting queen Marie Louise as a libertine, for instance, much
as Marie Antoinette was portrayed in FranceÞ.186 Finally, Charles IV threw
himself into a “war of public opinion” ðguerra de opinionÞ against his son and
his partisans. The reason for this desperate measure was none other than the ter-
rible internal and external crises gripping the Hispanic monarchy: epidemics and
shortages of almost apocalyptic proportions, economic strangulation by the fi-
nancial exigencies of Napoleon and the British commercial blockade in the
Atlantic, a series of military setbacks, the aforementioned opposition of the most
traditional sectors, and the unpopularity of Manuel Godoy. Faced with this un-
precedented situation of instability and disrepute, the monarch sought an equally
unprecedented solution, opening up traditionally secret subjects to public knowl-
edge, as Louis XVI had done in France in allowing the publication of the Compte
rendu or permitting the French parliament to attempt the famous Affair of the
Diamond Necklace.
We could consider the disaster of the battle of Trafalgar ð1805Þ to mark apolicy shift of this kind, since rather than concealing it, the Crown intensely
184 Antonio Calvo Maturana, “Elizabeth Holland: Portavoz de los silenciados y cóm-
plice de un tópico,” Cuadernos de historia moderna 29 ð2004Þ: 65–90, 88.
185 “½The partido fernandino grew into an impetuous torrent, dragging popular opinion
along behind it. It sent commissioners to the provinces to prepare the masses, relating the
relevant qualities of the heir to the throne, his love for religion; and the despotism ex-
ercised, in their view, by the monarchs’ favorite, who deprived Ferdinand of any role in af-
fairs, going so far as to close the doors of the council to him. . . . The commissioners
found the provinces fertile for sowing rampant discord” ðEstanislao de Kosca Vayo,
Historia de la vida y reinado de Fernando VII de España, con documentos justificativos,
ordenes reservadas y numerosas cartas del mismo Monarca Pío VII, Carlos IV, María
Luisa, Napoleón, Luís XVIII, el Infante Don Carlos y otros personajes ½Madrid, 1842,
1:21Þ.
186 Antonio CalvoMaturana,María Luisa de Parma: Reina de España, esclava del mito
ðGranada, 2007Þ.
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42 Calvo Maturanapublicized it; but the fact that the battle took place on the coast of Cádiz, within
sight of numerous Spaniards, suggests that the event was impossible to cover up.
To avoid repeating the same mistake they had committed in handling the breach
of the Lorca dam, authorities preferred to offer their own version of the event,
fomenting a great quantity of publications in verse and prose. These official ver-
sions did not ultimately lie—at no time was the military setback denied—but
they did attempt to present a humiliating defeat as a heroic episode.
But the real milestone in the modus operandi of the Spanish monarchy, the
event that catalyzed the new approach of informing the public about internal
political affairs, was the so-called conspiracy of El Escorial.187 Prince Ferdi-
nand’s plot against his father was not resolved secretly, as was the crisis of
1781 between Charles III and the Princes of Asturias,188 or the Princess María
Antonia’s betrayal of her in-laws in providing information to the English enemy
ð1802–6Þ.189 Very much to the contrary: in 1807 Charles IV attempted to over-
come his bad public image by portraying his son to the people as a traitor—an
unprecedented scenario in the history of the Hispanic monarchy.
Charles IVarrested his son and published the harsh decree of October 30, 1807,
making public all that had transpired. He said that he did not wish to “refrain
from expressing a source of chagrin to my vassals, which will be less so with
demonstrations of their loyalty.”190 This decree was followed on November 3
by a communiqué to be read by all the priests of the kingdom to ensure that
it reached the entire population.191 After the internal crisis was apparently re-
solved with the prince’s confession and the monarch’s pardon, Charles ad-
dressed his vassals once again on November 5, this time going so far as to
publish the letters of apology from the prince to his parents and attempting to
persuade the people of his magnanimity in pardoning his wayward and regret-
ful son. Once again, this decree was to be communicated “to my Councils and
Tribunals, who are to circulate it among my People so that they may appreciate
in it my mercifulness and justice, and so that the sorrow and misgivings in-
187 In 1807, on the Royal Site of El Escorial, Charles IV found compromising papers
in his son’s rooms that proved he was conspiring to take the throne. See Emilio La Parra
López,Manuel Godoy: La aventura del poder ðBarcelona, 2002Þ, 358–72; and Francisco
Martí Gilabert, El proceso del Escorial ðPamplona, 1963Þ.
188 On this rapprochement of Prince Charles and the Count of Aranda, behind the backs
of Charles III and the secretary of state, Floridablanca, see Juan Pérez De Guzmán y Gallo,
“Reparaciones a la vida e historia de Carlos IV y María Luisa: La primera calumnia,”
Revista de archivos, bibliotecas y museos 8, no. 10 ð1904Þ; and Rafael Olaechea, El conde
de Aranda y el “partido aragonés” ðZaragoza, 1969Þ, 124–94.
189 La Parra, Manuel Godoy, 350–58.
190 Royal Decree of October 30, 1807.
191 Joaquín Company, Nos D. Fr. Joaquín Company . . . arzobispo de Valencia . . . a
todos nuestros diocesanos, salud y paz en nuestro señor Jesucristo. En unos tiempos tan
infelices, en que nuestros enemigos comenten ultrajes en los sagrados Templos . . . ðNo-
vember 12, 1807Þ.
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The Debate on Public Information in Spain 43spired in them by my first Decree may be alleviated; for in ½that decree they
saw the danger to their Sovereign and Father, who loves them as his sons, as
they love me ½as their father.”192
Yet it was useless for Charles IV to throw himself into the arms of the pub-
lic. On the contrary, this political maneuver was totally counterproductive; per-
haps it came too late, when the people had already been completely won over by
the fernandinos. The sources from the period show Ferdinand reinforcing his
image as a martyr in the public eye and demonstrate that Charles IV’s decree
“consternated the capital and outraged the public.”193 The Council of Castile it-
self, in punishing Ferdinand’s partisans so gently ðby exiling themÞ, proved the
monarch’s situation to be untenable. There was little to be done, given that at
the beginning of the century “it was common to perceive Charles IV as good,
but weak and foolish; and to consider the Queen a wicked woman” and Godoy
“a monster.”194 Sources describe contempt for the king and hatred for the queen
and Godoy. In contrast, prince Ferdinand had an almost mythological demeanor,
“people of diverse and contrary opinions fancying his person to be endowed
with all the qualities they desire in a future monarch.”195 Years later, the exiled
minister Godoy would write in his memoir that Charles IV committed a great
mistake by not concealing his son’s betrayal, given that “what was more im-
portant than anything in such delicate circumstances . . . was to drown any seed
of discord and preserve the union of the kingdom, the dignity of the throne,
and respect for the government.”196
It seems obvious that the king had lost the battle over public opinion. The
politician Alcalá Galiano, a young man eighteen years of age at that time, admits
in his Memoir that he “then participated in the common error” of considering
Ferdinand and his followers “½to be martyrs and confessors of a true faith, whose
triumphwas anxiously hoped for.”197 Every sort of rumor about the monarchs was
taken to be true, from the queen’s love affairs to the possibility that Charles IV
would name his “favorite,” Godoy, as regent.198 A few months later, in March
of 1808, besieged by rumors and with the French armies moving at will through-
out Spain, Ferdinand’s parents and Godoy ended up being overthrown in the mu-
199tiny of Aranjuez.
192 Royal Decree of November 5, 1807.
193 García de León, Memorias, 122.
194 Antonio Alcalá Galiano, Recuerdos de un anciano ðBarcelona, 2004Þ, 11.
195 Ibid., 38.
196 Manuel Godoy, Memorias ðAlicante, 2008Þ, 1352–62.
197 Antonio Alcalá Galiano, “Memorias,” in Biblioteca de autores Españoles ðMadrid,
1955Þ, 83:323–24.
198 On the traditional black legend surrounding King Charles IV, Queen María Luisa
de Parma, and the minister Manuel Godoy, see, respectively, Teófanes Egido, Carlos IV
ðMadrid, 2001Þ; Calvo Maturana, María Luisa de Parma; and La Parra, Manuel Godoy.
199 La Parra, Manuel Godoy, 382–97.
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44 Calvo MaturanaThe mutiny had helped Ferdinand VII to dethrone his father—an event without
precedent in the Spain of the ancien régime—but he faced grim prospects.200 The
population was very tense due to the uprisings against Godoy and his partisans
in many areas of the peninsula. On the other hand, the French army, which had
entered Spain with the excuse of conquering Portugal,201 was beginning to arouse
suspicions everywhere. Would Napoleon support Ferdinand VII or the deposed
Charles IV?202 Few yet suspected that the emperor wanted the throne for him-
self.203 Both Charles IV ðbefore losing the crownÞ and Ferdinand VII addressed
the public intensively through announcements and edicts ðwhich were in turn
included in the pressÞ to calm the mood of a population grappling with the pres-
ence of the French army.204 The “public”205 was mentioned in all the texts, clearly
stipulated as an interlocutor and symbol of the population as a whole with phrases
such as “I make it known to the public” or “may the news reach the Public.”
The announcement Al público de Madrid ðTo the public of MadridÞ by the Coun-
cil of Castile saved Ferdinand VII from the dishonor of practically begging the
overwrought population to calm itself and go home, promising that the king
“will act . . . to promote public happiness and to fulfill the wishes of the Peo-
ple of Madrid.”206 An absolute monarch promised to fulfill the wishes of the
people!
Royal secrecy was shattered. In his struggle to legitimize his irregular ascent
to the throne, Ferdinand made public his own version of the conspiracy of El
Escorial, blaming Manuel Godoy and the naïveté of the king for all that had
occurred.207 In April, Ferdinand departed to meet with Napoleon, and once again
the public was duly informed. A fictitious dialogue between the public and the
200 Charles Esdaile, The Peninsular War: A New History ðLondon, 2002Þ.
201 In virtue of the Treaty of Fontainebleau ð1807Þ.
202 Although Charles IV’s abdication was ostensibly amicable, he repudiated the agree-
ment a few days later, alleging that he had been forced to abdicate.
203 In 1835, the count of Toreno would blame this situation precisely on the lack of
information and freedom of expression: “Until then, while some were suspicious of
Napoleon’s intentions, the majority only saw in his person strong support for the nation
and a sincere protector of the new monarch. The perfidy of the capture of fortresses or
other events that could only be interpreted as questionable were attributed to the vile mach-
inations of Don Manuel Godoy, or to fair precautions on the part of the emperor of the
French. Faulty judgment, to be sure, but only to be expected in a country deprived of
news media ½medios de publicidad and free discussion to illuminate and rectify the er-
rors of public opinion.” Conde de Toreno, Historia del levantamiento, guerra y revo-
lución de España ðMadrid, 2008Þ, 55.
204 Adolfo Carrasco Martínez, “La crisis de 1808 en la opinión pública,” Cuadernos de
investigación histórica 24 ð2007Þ: 19–40.
205 For example, the edict of March 16, 1808, on the peaceful intentions of the French
army ðin Diario de Madrid, March 18, 1808Þ.
206 El consejo al público de Madrid, March 20, 1808 ðArchives Nationales de Paris, F7,
6517bÞ.
207 Gaceta Extraordinaria de Madrid ðMarch 31, 1808Þ, 317–23.
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The Debate on Public Information in Spain 45absolute king is established the moment the monarch responds to the public’s
doubts regarding the wisdom of that dangerous journey:
The King is grateful for the extraordinary affection of his loyal people . . . but . . . he can do
no less than to make everyone, each and every individual, aware that he would not resolve
to embark on this important journey, were he not certain of the sincere and cordial
friendship of his ally, the Emperor of the French, or that the journey will have the happiest
of consequences: he orders them, then, to calm themselves and to wait, for in less than 4
or 6 days, they will give thanks to God and to the prudence of His Majesty for the absence
that now disquiets them.208
But Ferdinand was mistaken. He was forced to stay in Bayonne and to return the
throne to his father so that he could relinquish it to Napoleon, who would, in turn,
cede it to his brother, Joseph Bonaparte.
In 1814, after the Peninsular War—six years during which a de facto freedom
of the press had existed—Ferdinand recovered the throne and attempted to
proceed as though nothing had happened.209 Upon arriving in Spain, he abol-
ished the Constitution of 1812, declared the liberals and the followers of
Joseph I to be outlaws, and attempted to use the support of the church and the
nobility to govern in a more conservative and reactionary way than had his father
ðwhose enmity toward those two groups had ended up costing him the throneÞ.
But after all that had happened within the peninsula and beyond during the
previous years, things would never be the same for the monarchy. Once his ini-
tial popularity had faded, Ferdidnand VII reigned ð1814–33Þ, plagued by fear of
conspiracies and obliged to reach out to the less radical of his political enemies
over the years. His daughter, Isabelle II, had to work closely with the liberals
in order to rule.210
Brief Conclusions
Although the French model is usually considered “canonical,” the disintegra-
tion of European absolutism came about in a variety of ways. The Spanish case
is of interest due to the prolonged survival of the absolute monarchy, which ul-
timately had no choice but to adopt—albeit timidly—dynamics typical of lib-
eral states. The reign of Charles IV, dramatically marked by the French Rev-
olution, is an ideal period to observe the survival strategies of the ancien régime
ðbetween reaction and syncretismÞ when faced with the new regime.
208 Segunda Gaceta Extraordinaria de Madrid ðApril 22, 1808Þ, 407.
209 Antonio Calvo Maturana, “‘Como si no hubiesen pasado jamás tales actos’: La
gestión fernandina de la memoria histórica durante el Sexenio Absolutista,” in Culturas
políticas monárquicas en la España liberal: Discursos, representaciones y prácticas
(1808–1885), ed. Encarna García Monerris, Mónica Moreno Seco, and Juan Marcuello
Benedicto ðforthcomingÞ.
210 Isabel Burdiel, Isabel II, una biografía (1830–1904) ðMadrid, 2010Þ.
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46 Calvo MaturanaWithout a doubt, the transition between the two models is marked by processes
that are difficult to analyze and pinpoint chronologically. One of them is the
emergence of public opinion as an authority in matters of state. This study has
attempted to take a snapshot of a moment of transition between two political
models: an older model in which discreet political action was taken without the
knowledge of the public, who had no right to express an opinion or to be aware
of the political process, and a contemporary liberal model, solidly founded in
public opinion, news media, the ideal of freedom of expression, supposed pol-
itical transparency, and so on. Obviously, the transition from one to the other
could not be made overnight.
Tocqueville’s idea of nuancing the idea of liberal revolution as a radical change
continues to make sense.211 In the preceding pages, we have analyzed the final
years of the reign of Charles IV, a monarch of the ancien régime, and we have
seen that it was the monarchy itself that broke with tradition. At times because it
needed to change social conventions to get the population to obey its increasingly
complex and intrusive legislation, and at times—less frequently—because it
wished to offer its own version of political events, the Crown began conveying
information to the people in greater depth.
It is clear that—although the sensibility of the Enlightenment did help—such
official explanations were given on the basis of their utility, or in order to stifle
crises that could not be resolved without shattering royal secrecy. The modus
operandi of the monarchy was to adapt to reality, but this was only a new means
of achieving the same old ends. Neither those who believed it was important to
inform the people nor those who believed it was best to maintain them in a
state of lethargy and ignorance argued from the moral point of view; rather,
they sought the attitude most favorable to the raison d’état. None of the au-
thors studied here wrote openly that it was advantageous to lie to the people,
nor would any have dared to say that the king did not speak the truth; the de-
bate oscillated between administrative silence, on the one hand, and the expla-
nation of the spirit of regulations and decisions, as well as the communication
of certain news traditionally concealed by the Crown, on the other.
But there is not much distance between an explanation useful for the raison
d’état and a desperate justification, and the absolutists knew that the latter under-
mined royal majesty.212 The authority of the king was at stake in new times that
both provoked the crisis of the absolute monarchy and gave the monarchs a
double-edged sword with which to attempt to overcome that crisis. Public
opinion: so useful when it is favorable, and so dangerous when it is not.
211 L’ancien régime et la Révolution ð1856Þ.
212 The count of Vergennes, contrary to Necker’s publicity measures, advised the king
that he was playing with fire: “If Necker’s public opinion gains force, your Majesty should
prepare yourself to see those who once obeyed, command, and those who once com-
manded, obey” ðquoted in López-Escobar, “La opinión pública,” 29Þ.
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